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THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA: LIFE IN THE
LOWER FEDERAL COURTS AFTER
TEAGUE v. LANE
MARC M. ARKN*
In 1989, in Teague v. Lane, a badly fragmented Supreme Court
rewrote the law of retroactivity to preclude the application of "new rules"
in habeas corpus cases unless those rules fell within two narrow excep-
tions. At the same time, the Court stated that it would no longer an-
nounce "new rules" of criminal procedure in collateral proceedings.
The result, according to dissenting members of the Court and to many
commentators, would be nothing less than the evisceration of the Great
Writ and a radical restriction of the traditional role of the lower federal
courts in the articulation of constitutional doctrine, not to mention con-
fusion in the application of Teague itself
In this Article, Professor Marc Arkin assesses the initial impact of
Teague by studying its application and development in the lower federal
courts. The Article first reviews the Teague decision and briefly dis-
cusses previous Supreme Court retroactivity doctrine. It next examines
four cases in which the Court first attempted to clarify Teague's new
doctrine of nonretroactivity. The Article then analyzes the lower federal
courts' effort to develop a consistent body of nonretroactivity doctrine in
the eighteen months following Teague In light of this, Professor Arkin
concludes that--although Teague issues arise less frequently than might
have been expected-most courts have ignored all invitations to read
Teague narrowly, thus curtailing consideration of the merits of habeas
corpus claims. The focus of creative advocacy and judicial reasoning
has, instead, shifted to narrowing the reach of Teague.
Professor Arkin also illuminates a new series ofproblems created by
the interplay between Teague's nonretroactivity analysis and existing
habeas corpus procedural rules. Calling this "the prisoner's dilemma, "
the author discusses the ironic predicament in which the habeas corpus
petitioner must prove that he is relying on a novel rule of law in order to
have the court excuse his procedural default or permit his successive pe-
tition-only to have the court invoke that very showing of novelty to bar
consideration of the claim pursuant to the rule of Teague Throughout,
Professor Arkin contends that the effect of Teague will not be the in-
tended lightening of the federal courts' habeas corpus workload, but,
rather, an increase in the complexity of that workload and a further
shift away from the merits of habeas litigation toward procedural issues.
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. A.B., Oberlin CoJlege,
1973; J.D., Yale Law School, 1982; Ph.D., Yale University, 1983. I thank Daniel Capra, Edward
Chikofsky, Michael Malloy, Michael Martin, Steve Thel, and Edward Yorio for their insightful
comments on earlier drafts of this article. I also thank Sandra Engle, Fordham University School of
Law, class of 1992, for her excellent research assistance.
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On February 22, 1989, the Supreme Court handed down a decision that
radically altered the legal landscape surrounding petitions for habeas corpus. In
Teague v. Lane,' a badly fractured Court rewrote the law of retroactivity in
habeas corpus proceedings to preclude the application of the so-called "new
rules" 2 to cases pending on habeas corpus unless those rules fit into two narrow
exceptions. The predominant response to Teague, both from the legal commu-
nity and the public, was that the decision sounded the death knell of habeas
corpus as a vehicle for the protection of defendants' rights.3 The sole area of
disagreement was whether or not this event was a welcome one.
4
One and one half years after Teague, it is possible to see the initial effects of
that decision on habeas corpus litigation in the lower federal courts. These re-
sults make it feasible to determine, at least preliminarily, whether predictions of
the demise of habeas corpus review were correct. Moreover, because Teague
effects a drastic break with previous law, it provides an excellent means for stud-
ying the articulation of a novel body of doctrine by the lower federal courts.
Although this article does not propose to supplement the already extensive body
of literature analyzing Teague itself,5 the lower courts' application of the deci-
1. 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989).
2. According to Teague, a new rule of criminal procedure is one which was "not dictated by
precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final." Id. at 1070 (plurality opin-
ion) (emphasis in original).
3. See, eg., Recent Development" The Court Declines in Fairness-Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct.
1060, 25 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 164, 182 (1990) ("Frank Teague is not the only loser. The
Teague bar may effectively slam the door on most federal review of state criminal cases and perma-
nently stunt the evolution of constitutional jurisprudence."); Note, Sixth Amendment: The Evolu-
tion of the Supreme Court's Retroactivity Doctrine: A Futile Search for Theoretical Clarity, 80 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1128, 1129 (1990) (suggesting that Teague has "eliminat[ed] the safe-
guards of fundamental fairness that come from examining the nature and purposes of proposed
rules"); Justices Limit Path to U.S. Courts for State Prisoners on Death Row, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6,
1990, § 1, at 1, col. 3 (discussing subsequent Supreme Court retroactivity opinions in habeas corpus
and noting that "[a]s the Supreme Court itself has grown more conservative over the years, it has
issued a number of decisions limiting habeas corpus jurisdiction").
4. On the same day the Court decided Teague, it also handed down Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct.
1038 (1989), which revised the law concerning procedural bars arising from state court review. Har-
ris held that when the last state tribunal to render judgment in a case has failed to articulate the
basis-state or federal--of its decision, the federal courts should presume reliance on federal law.
Id. at 1042 (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 (1983) ("plain statement rule")). Thus, a
state prisoner's procedural default will bar access to a federal habeas forum only if the state court's
opinion plainly indicates reliance on a state procedural rule. Id. at 1044. Teague has been perceived
as a greater threat to defendants' rights than Harris because the latter appears, at first glance, to be
more innocuous. The effect of Harris, however, may be more deleterious in the long run since it
offers state courts an incentive to alter their writing habits and thereby insulate their decisions from
federal habeas review. Indeed, if predictions are in order, it can be predicted that, ofthe two habeas
decisions, Harris will work the more significant curtailment of habeas corpus litigation, despite early
returns to the contrary. This is due to the frequency with which prosecutors and courts alike invoke
procedural bars as a defense to habeas petitions. See, e-g., Note, Harris v. Reed- A New Look at
Federal Habeas Jurisdiction over State Prisoners, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 493, 507-08 (1989); cf. Jef-
fries & Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Procedural Default in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L.
REv. 679, 679-90 (discussion of present law of procedural default and citing recent literature).
5. See, eg., I J. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 22A.1
(Supp. 1989) (extensive discussion of Teague retroactivity analysis and related case law); Hoffman,
Retroactivity and the Great WriL" How Congress Should Respond to Teague v. Lane, 1990 B.Y.U. L.
REv. 183; Weisberg, A Great Writ While It Lasted, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 9 (1990); The
Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Leading Cases, 103 HARv. L. REv. 137, 290-300 (1989) (discussing
Teague). For further discussion, see articles cited supra note 3.
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sion vividly illuminates both the weaknesses and strengths of the Supreme
Court's effort to rewrite the law of retroactivity in collateral proceedings.
This Article first reviews the Teague decision and the Supreme Court's ef-
forts to clarify the meaning and scope of Teague in a quartet of recent opinions:
Penry v. Lynaugh,6 Butler v. McKellar,7 Saffle v. Parks,8 and Sawyer v. Smith.9
It then canvasses lower courts' efforts to thread their way through the complexi-
ties of Teague to develop a consistent body of retroactivity doctrine in habeas
corpus cases. This discussion will show that Teague has had a more limited
effect in the lower courts than many had predicted. Yet, the lower federal courts
have declined virtually every opportunity to construe Teague narrowly. They
have applied the decision to collateral attacks brought by federal prisoners; they
have found that most rules fall within Teague's definition of novelty; they have
found that few rules fall within either of the two Teague exceptions by reading
both quite restrictively. While there is some disarray among the lower courts,
the restrictive tendency of their decisions is self-evident. 10
Lower federal court decisions also contain intimations of a different series
of problems for prisoners seeking habeas review of their convictions. These
problems, which might be termed the prisoner's dilemma, arise from the inter-
play between Teague's refusal to announce or apply "new rules" retroactively in
habeas corpus and existing law which permits successive habeas petitions attack-
ing a single conviction and excuses state procedural default on a showing that
the rule being applied is "new." The prisoner may have his procedural default
excused, or his second petition heard, only to find that his underlying claim is
now barred by Teague-winning the battle to lose the war. The irony of these
decisions is evident; with each attempt to curtail the lower federal courts' habeas
workload, the Supreme Court has increased the complexity of that workload
and, while decrying the use of technicalities in habeas corpus litigation, has actu-
ally shifted the focus away from the merits and onto procedural issues.1 I
I. RETROACTIVITY IN THE SUPREME COURT: TEAGUE v LANE
AND IrS PROGENY
Frank Dean Teague, a black defendant, was convicted by an all-white jury
in an Illinois state court of the armed robbery of an A & P supermarket and the
attempted murder of police officers. After an unsuccessful direct appeal, in
which he argued that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges had denied
him the right to be tried by a jury representative of the community, 12 Teague
6. 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
7. 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990).
8. 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990).
9. 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990).
10. Moreover, this direction was clear even before the Supreme Court's decisions in Butler,
Saffle, and Sawyer.
11. Cf. ABA Task Force on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, Toward a More Just and Effective
System of Review in State Death Penalty Cases, 163 n.308 (Oct. 1989) (discussing effect of added
procedural hurdles on litigation on the merits).
12. The Illinois Appellate Court denied Teague's claim on the ground that he had failed to
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filed a petition for federal habeas corpus. In his petition, Teague repeated his
fair cross-section claim and argued, in addition, that the opinions arising from
the denial of certiorari in the case of McCray v. New York 1 3 had invited a reex-
amination of the existing precedent of Swain v. Alabama.14 The district court
held itself to be bound by Swain,15 but a panel of the Seventh Circuit concluded
that Teague had stated a prima facie case of discrimination and that the sixth
amendment barred the prosecution from using peremptory challenges in such a
way as to deprive the defendant of the opportunity to obtain a representative
jury.16 The Seventh Circuit later vacated the panel opinion and voted to rehear
the case en banc, 17 subsequently postponing that hearing to await the Supreme
Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky.
1 8
The Supreme Court decided Batson in a way which appeared to favor
Teague's claims of discrimination in jury selection. 19 Before the Seventh Circuit
could hold its en banc hearing in Teague's case, however, the Supreme Court
decided Allen v. Hardy,20 holding that Batson could not be applied retroactively
to cases on collateral review. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc,
held that Teague could not benefit from the new Batson rule.2 1 Adding insult to
injury, the court of appeals also held that Teague's Swain claim was procedur-
ally barred22 and, in any event, was without merit because the fair cross-section
requirement was limited to the jury venire and did not apply to the panel itself.
23
Teague then brought his claim before the Supreme Court, arguing in part
that the sixth amendment fair cross-section requirement should extend to the
demonstrate the systematic exclusion of black jurors as required by Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202
(1965). People v. Teague, 108 Ill. App. 3d 891, 895-96, 439 N.E.2d 1066, 1070 (1982). The Illinois
Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, People v. Teague, 93 Ill. 2d 547, 449 N.E.2d 820 (1983), and
the United States Supreme Court denied Teague's petition for writ of certiorari, Teague v. Illinois,
464 U.S. 867 (1983), thereby rendering Teague's conviction "final." It should be noted that certain
states do not date finality from the completion of a prisoner's direct appeal, but rather from the end
of her first state post-conviction remedy.
13. 461 U.S. 961 (1983). Writing for the Court in the denial of certiorari in McCray, Justice
Stevens stated, "I believe that further consideration of the substantive and procedural ramifications
of the problem by other courts will enable us to deal with the question more wisely at a later date."
Id. at 962.
14. 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (requiring that a defendant prove a systematic exclusion of black jurors
throughout the district in order to make out a claim of racial discrimination in the venire, and
reiterating that there is no right to a representative cross-section in the petit jury).
15. The district court opinion was unreported. See Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. at 1065-66.
16. The panel decision was not published. See United States ex rel. Teague v. Lane, 779 F.2d
1332, 1332-33 (7th Cir. 1985) (en bane).
17. Id. at 1332.
18. 476 U.S. 79 (1986); see Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1066.
19. In Batson, the Supreme Court overruled the portion of Swain that dealt with the evidentiary
showing necessary to establish a claim of racial discrimination in a prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges. Batson held that a defendant can establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination by
showing that the defendant is a member of a cognizable racial group, that the prosecutor exercised
his peremptory challenges to eliminate members of that racial group from the venire, and that these
and other circumstances raise an inference of racial discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93.
20. 478 U.S. 255 (1986).
21. Teague v. Lane, 820 F.2d 832, 834 n.4 (7th Cir. 1987) (en bane).
22. Id. at 834 n.6.
23. Id. at 834-43. Judge Cudahy dissented, arguing that the fair cross section requirement
should be extended to the petit jury. Id. at 847-51 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
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petit jury. In its decision, the Court refused to consider the merits of his sixth
amendment claim on the ground that it called for a new rule of constitutional
criminal procedure. In so doing, the Court-without the benefit of briefing or
oral argument-announced a new rule of its own.
A. Retroactivity Before Teague v. Lane
As a general principle, legal decisions that announce a new rule of law ap-
ply retroactively. 24 Twenty-five years ago, in Linkletter v. Walker,2 5 the
Supreme Court qualified this rule, stating that the "Constitution neither prohib-
its nor requires [that] retrospective effect" be given to new constitutional rules of
criminal procedure. 26 Since the Linkletter decision, the Court occasionally has
found a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure to be so disruptive of pre-
existing law that it has refused to apply the new rule to cases that had already
reached a specified stage in their proceedings when the new rule was an-
nounced. 27 In deciding whether to apply a rule retroactively or only prospec-
tively, the Court consciously refused to differentiate between habeas corpus and
other proceedings. 28 Rather, the Court used the same three part test to deter-
mine retroactivity without regard to whether the case was on direct or collateral
review, weighing "(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the
extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c)
the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new
standards."
'29
Even as the Court committed itself to the Linkletter doctrine of retroactiv-
ity, Justice Harlan criticized both the Linkletter rationale and its expression in
the three-factor test.30 Instead, Justice Harlan argued that all new rules should
be applied retroactively to cases not yet final and that no new rule should be
applied retroactively to cases already final, thus distinguishing between cases on
24. See C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 29.07, at 711 (1986). The
literature on retroactivity is extensive. See, e.g., Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique
and a Proposal, 61 VA. L. REV. 1557 (1975); Corr, Retroactivity: A Study in Supreme Court Doctrine
' As Applied", 61 N.C.L. REv. 745 (1983); Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, The Great Writ and
The Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARv. L. Rxv. 56 (1965); Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability
and Due Process A Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 719 (1966). Cf. Hoffman, supra
note 5, at 183-98.
25. 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (holding that Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which applied the
exclusionary rule to the states, should not be retroactive).
26. Id. at 629. In Linkletter, the Court created a balancing test requiring consideration of the
"prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective application
will further or retard its operation." Id.
27. See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (holding nonretroactive United States v.
Wade, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), which applied the sixth amendment right to counsel to lineups); Johnson
v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) (holding nonretroactive Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), which established the right to counsel at interrogations); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618
(1965) (holding nonretroactive Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which applied the exclusionary
rule to the states).
28. See, e.g., Stovall, 388 U.S. at 300 ("[No distinction is justified between convictions now
final, as in the instant case, and convictions at various stages of trial and direct review.").
29. Id. at 297 (cited with approval in Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. at 1078 (White, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment)).
30. Eg., Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256 (1969) (Harlan, I., dissenting).
1991]
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direct and collateralfreview for purposes of retroactivity. 31 Justice Harlan con-
tended that this distinction was necessary to meet the needs of finality in crimi-
nal litigation.32 However, Justice Harlan did recognize two exceptions to his
position regarding nonretroactivity on collateral review. 33 The first was for now
rules that "place, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, certain kinds of
primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-mak-
ing authority to proscribe."' 34 As Justice Harlan initially envisioned the second
exception, it applied only to rules which "significantly improve" existing
factfinding procedures. 35 Justice Harlan subsequently revised this view, sug-
gesting that the second exception should apply to rules that involve procedures
"'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' "36 It was Justice Harlan's criti-
cism which was to shape the course of future law, emerging triumphant in
Teague v. Lane.
Indeed, with the Court's 1982 decision in United States v. Johnson,37 Justice
Harlan's view began to prevail. In Johnson, the Court held that new fourth
amendment rules should be applied retroactively to nonfinal convictions, but
should not be applied to cases on collateral review. 38 Five years later, in Griffith
v. Kentucky,39 the Court fully embraced the first half of Justice Harlan's retroac-
tivity model, holding that a new rule must be applied to all cases not final at the
time the rule is handed down.4° At the same time, the Court failed to decide
whether cases on habeas corpus were final within the meaning of the Griffith
rule. In 1988, in Yates v. Aiken, 41 the Court explicitly raised this issue, but did
not clearly decide it. After Aiken, however, the stage was set for the next terni's
decision in Teague v. Lane. And, in Teague, the Court for the first time adopted
the second prong of Justice Harlan's view, expressly precluding the application
of new rules of criminal procedure in habeas corpus.
B. The Supreme Court's Opinion in Teague v. Lane
In the first three parts of the Teague plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor
31. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 675 (Harlan, J., concurring); Desist, 394 U.S. at 256 (Harlan, I., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
32. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 691 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("No one, not criminal
defendants, not the judicial system, not society as a whole is benefited by a judgment providing a
man shall tentatively go to jail today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter his continued incarcer-
ation shall be subject to fresh litigation on issues already resolved.")).
33. See Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1088, 1093 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
34. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
35. Desist, 394 U.S. at 262 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
36. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
37. 457 U.S. 537 (1982).
38. Id. at 562. The Johnson Court also held that there should be an exception for cases which
represented a "clear break" from past rules. Id. at 549.
39. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
40. Id. at 328 ("[A] new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroac-
tively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for
cases in which the rule constitutes a 'clear break' with the past.").
41. 484 U.S. 211 (1988).
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explained that Allen v. Hardy42 barred the application of Batson v. Kentucky43
to Teague's case because his conviction was final at the time Batson was an-
nounced. 44 Justice O'Connor also found that Teague was procedurally barred
from raising his challenge to the jury's composition under Swain v. Alabama
because he had failed to raise the claim either at trial or on direct appeal.45 Had
Justice O'Connor done no more, the opinion probably would have passed unno-
ticed by any save Frank Teague and his counsel.
In Parts IV and V of her opinion, however, Justice O'Connor reached out
to make a major statement about the applicability of new rules of law in habeas
corpus, an issue neither briefed nor argued by the parties themselves.46 More-
over, the rather complex configuration of the concurrences in Parts IV and V
initially raised doubt about the viability of the decision.47 In fact, Justice
O'Connor's opinion contained two novel rules which were not clearly distin-
guished from each other. The first was that a "new rule" of law no longer would
be applied retroactively in habeas corpus to benefit a petitioner whose conviction
had become final before the rule was announced unless the "new rule" fell
within two narrowly defined exceptions. 48 The second, derived from the first,
was that the Court would no longer announce new rules of constitutional crimi-
42. 478 U.S. 255 (1986).
43. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
44. Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1067 (1989). By "final" the Court meant that the defend-
ant had completed his state direct appeal and had received a final disposition of his petition for
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Id. (citing Allen v. Hardy, 4.78 U.S. 255, 258 n.1
(1986), which, in turn, relied on the standard set forth in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636
(1965)).
45. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1067. Teague was barred from raising the Swain claim unless he
could show both cause for his failure to present the issue to the state courts and prejudice arising
from that failure. Id. at 1068 (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 113-14, 117, 124-35 (1982)).
46. Id. at 1084 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated:
Today a plurality of this Court, without benefit of briefing and oral argument, adopts a
novel threshold test for federal review of state criminal convictions on habeas corpus.... I
cannot acquiesce in this unprecedented curtailment of the reach of the Great Writ, particu-
larly in the absence of any discussion of these momentous changes by the parties or the
lower courts.
Id.; see also id. at 1086 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (again noting the sua sponte nature of the plurality
opinion).
47. Parts IV and V of the Teague opinion were espoused only by a four-vote plurality consisting
of Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice White, who had con-
curred with these four in Parts I, II, and III to form a majority, grudgingly called Parts IV and V
"an acceptable application in collateral proceedings of the theories embraced by the Court in cases
dealing with direct review" and concurred in the result. Id. at 1079 (White, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment). Justice White explained that he regretted that the Court had
departed from the three-part balancing test of Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967), in ques-
tions of retroactivity but recognized that Stovall had long been a dead letter. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at
1079 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens, joined by
Justice Blackmun, generally endorsed the plurality's approach to retroactivity, but disagreed with
the plurality's application of that approach. Id. at 1079 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment). Justice Blackmun joined part I of Justice Stevens's two-part concurrence and
concurred in the result insofar as Teague's claim was based on Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202
(1965). Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1079 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment). Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented from the decision altogether. Id. at 1084 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
48. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1070.
1991]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
nal procedure in cases on habeas corpus review.49
Complicating matters further, Justice O'Connor also developed a novel def-
inition of what constitutes a "new rule" of law. As Justice O'Connor explained,
"a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing
at the time the defendant's conviction became final." 50 A new rule of law is one
which "breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the
Federal Government." 51 In all but unusual cases, therefore, a federal habeas
corpus petitioner attacking a state conviction may rely only on the law in effect
at the time that his conviction became final. While all new rules apply retroac-
tively to cases on direct review, almost none apply to cases on collateral review.
Justice O'Connor explained that this rule of nonretroactivity accorded with
the purposes of habeas corpus, because collateral review was intended to enforce
"'the constitutional standards that prevailed at the time the original proceedings
took place.' "52 "Implicit" in this approach, according to the plurality, is the
principle that habeas corpus proceedings cannot be used to create new constitu-
tional rules of criminal procedure. 53 Despite the explicit disagreement of Jus-
tices Stevens and Blackmun, the plurality also held that retroactivity must be
treated as a threshold question to be addressed before the habeas court considers
either the nature of the rule advocated or its possible application to the peti-
tioner's case.54 Not only should the habeas court not apply the "new rule" to
petitioners, the plurality continued, but in cases in which it might be called on to
create a "new rule," the habeas court should not even discuss what the rule
49. Id. at 1077-78.
50. Id. at 1070.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1073 (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 263 (1969) (Harlan, Y.,
dissenting)).
53. Id. at 1069, 1078. The Court's reasoning on this point does not withstand exacting scru-
tiny. The most favorable reading of Justice O'Connor's opinion would focus on her discussion of the
inequity of the Court's prior practice of announcing a new rule of procedure in one case and then
considering the retroactivity of that rule in habeas corpus proceedings in another, id, at 1077-78, a
practice exemplified by the pair of opinions Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and Allen v.
Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986). See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text. Accordingly, as the
plurality argued, since the rule advocated by Teague could not be applied retroactively to subsequent
cases on collateral review, it should not be applied to Frank Teague either. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at
1078.
54. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1069-70. Justice Stevens argued that novelty could not be a threshold
test because "until a rule is set forth, it would be extremely difficult to evaluate whether the rule is
'new' at all." Id. at 1079 n.2 (Stevens, 3., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
In his concurrence, Justice White did not state any opinion as to whether Teague should consti-
tute a threshold test. Id. at 1078-79 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
However, he later supported this position when he joined Justice Scalia's separate opinion in Penry
v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2963-64 (1989) (Scalia, 3., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
-Justice Stevens, writing separately in Penry, iterated his view that the constitutional rule should be
articulated before Teague is applied. Id. at 2963 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("[I]t is neither logical nor prudent to consider a rule's retroactive application before the rule
itself is articulated.") (citing Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1079 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)). Indeed, in Penry, the entire Court subscribed to a passage in Justice O'Connor's
opinion stating, "[blecause Penry is before us on collateral review, we must determine, as a threshold
matter, whether granting him the relief he seeks would create a 'new rule.'" Penry, 109 S. Ct. at
2944. The confusion of the Court on this issue prompted the Fifth Circuit to observe: "We must
take care, however, not to overstate the significance of these votes." Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d




Just as she had taken up Justice Harlan's position distinguishing between
retroactivity on direct and collateral review, Justice O'Connor also adopted Jus-
tice Harlan's views with regard to the two exceptions to the rule of nonretroac-
tivity on collateral review.5 6 First, the petitioner may rely on a new rule of law
"if it places 'certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the
power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.' ,,57 Second, petitioner
may rely on a new rule of law if it is one of those "watershed rules of criminal
procedure" which "implicate[s] the fundamental fairness of the trial" and "with-
out which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished."5 8
The first exception is obviously a narrow one, but Justice O'Connor also empha-
sized the limited scope of the second exception by pointing out that "we operate
from the premise that such procedures would be so central to an accurate deter-
mination of innocence or guilt,... [that it is] unlikely that many such compo-
nents of basic due process have yet to emerge."5 9 In fact, it appears that Justice
O'Connor adopted Justice Harlan's earlier view of the second exception, a view
later rejected by Justice Harlan himself.6°
The Teague decision left open a number of questions, including-as a result
of the Court's extraordinary fragmentation-the plurality opinion's own author-
ity and viability. Teague's reach remained unclear as well. Justice O'Connor
herself explicitly reserved the question of whether Teague would apply in the
capital sentencing context. 61 Justice Brennan pointed out that the plurality
opinion did not decide whether Teague applies to collateral attacks on federal
convictions.62 In addition, the actual meaning of Teague remained obscure on a
number of points. How were courts to understand the requirement that retroac-
tivity be addressed as a "threshold matter" without consideration of the merits
of the rule? How were they to fix the meaning of the term "new rule"? What
was the reach to be given the two exceptions to nonretroactivity, and in particu-
lar, were courts to follow the earlier or the later views of Justice Harlan in their
decisions? As the lower courts began to face the task of applying Teague to the
petitions before them, all of these questions remained unsettled.
55. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1078. The plurality engaged in a rather obscure discussion of why
such a practice would constitute the rendering of an advisory opinion. This may well demonstrate
that one person's advisory opinion is another person's dicta.
56. Id. at 1075-77.
57. Id. at 1075 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
58. Id. at 1075-77.
59. Id. at 1077.
60. See id. at 1080 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (indicating
a preference for Justice Harlan's later view); cf. id. at 1093 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that
Justice O'Connor construed Justice Harlan's views regarding the second Teague exception too nar-
rowly). See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
61. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1077 n.3.
62. Id. at 1084 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1991]
380 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
C. Supreme Court Decisions Elaborating Teague' Retroactivity Analysis
The Supreme Court itself resolved some of the questions left unanswered by
Teague in a quartet of decisions applying Teague's retroactivity analysis. 63 The
Court decided the first of these, Penry v. Lynaugh,64 later in the same term as
Teague. The legal issues in Penry revolved around the conditions for imposing
the death penalty, thus settling whether Teague applied in the capital sentencing
context. 65 Instead, the Penry Court focused on and struggled with the meaning
of a "new rule." Penry involved a challenge to the jury instructions given under
Texas law in the capital sentencing phase of a trial. Over ten years earlier, in
Jurek v. Texas,66 the Supreme Court had held the Texas capital sentencing stat-
ute to be constitutional. The petitioner in Penry, however, argued that the Texas
statutory instructions were constitutionally deficient in his case because they did
not give the sentencing jury adequate discretion to make effective use of mitigat-
ing evidence concerning his mental retardation and abused background in decid-
ing whether to impose the death penalty.
Applying Teague, Justice O'Connor first turned to the "threshold" question
of whether granting Penry the relief he requested would create a "new rule."
67
On its face, Penry's claim seemed to require the Court to find that the Texas
capital sentencing statute was unconstitutional as applied, a position inconsistent
with the binding authority of Jurek. Nevertheless, Justice O'Connor argued that
Penry would not create "new law," in the process espousing a rather narrow
view of novelty.68 Relying on Yates v. Aiken 69 for support, Justice O'Connor
held that the rule Penry sought to establish was dictated by existing case law in
the capital sentencing context70 and would do no more than "fulfill the assur-
63. Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990); Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990); Butler v.
McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990); Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
64. 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
65. Id. at 2944. Justice O'Connor wrote this part of the Court's opinion and was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and Kennedy; that is, the Teague core majority.
However, Justice Stevens retained his reticence regarding the application of Teague in capital cases.
Id. at 2963 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
67. Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2944.
68. Id. at 2947.
69. Id. at 2944 (citing Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211 (1988)). In Yates, the Supreme Court
unanimously held that the rule in Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985), which forbade the use of
certain permissive presumptions on the issue of mens rea in jury instructions, raised no retroactivity
problem because it was merely an extension of the principles of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510
(1979), which invalidated mandatory presumptions in jury instructions regarding mens rea. Yates,
484 U.S. at 216-17. Oddly enough, although the Yates Court was willing to agree that Franklin did
not present a new rule, four Justices had dissented from the "extension" of Sandstrom. Franklin,
471 U.S. at 329 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 332 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (joined by Burger, C.J.,
and O'Connor, J.). Thus Franklin could hardly be said to be "dictated by" existing law.
70. Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2944-47. Justice O'Connor found that the rule advocated by Penry was
dictated by Supreme Court decisions in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion) (the
sentencer should not be precluded from considering any evidence of the defendant's character of-
fered by the defendant as a basis for imposing a sentence other than death) and Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (a sentencing jury may not be precluded from considering any rele-
vant mitigating evidence offered by the defense to lessen the death sentence).
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ance upon which Jurek was based."'7 1 In so finding, Justice O'Connor caused a
realignment of the personnel in an already fragmented Court; she was joined in
this part of her opinion by the Justices who had been most skeptical of the
Teague approach.
In dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White and Kennedy-the "hard core" of the Teague majority-strongly criti-
cized Justice O'Connor's position regarding the novelty of Penry's claim.7 2 Ac-
cording to Justice Scalia, Penry both created a "new rule" within the meaning of
Teague and then applied that rule retroactively to a case on collateral review.
73
Prom the standpoint of the purpose of habeas corpus review enunciated in
Teague-to create an incentive for trial courts to conduct their proceedings in
accord with then-existing constitutional norms74-Justice Scalia argued that the
Penry decision was inexplicable. 75 As he stated,
It seems to me utterly impossible to say that a judge acting in good
faith and with care should have known the rule announced today, and
that future fault similar to that of which the Texas courts have been
guilty must be deterred by making good on the 'threat' of habeas
corpus.
76
Justice Scalia concluded his remarks by accusing Justice O'Connor of gutting
Teague in the very term in which it had been announced. 77 Penry clearly
demonstrated the division in the Court over the meaning of novelty, resulting in
a fair degree of uncertainty in the commentary.
7 s
Slightly more than a year after the Teague decision, the Court decided-on
the same day-two more cases explicating its position regarding retroactivity in
collateral proceedings. The results were not encouraging for those who had ex-
pected that the narrow reading given Teague in Penry was to be the wave of the
future. Moreover, both cases showed the "hard core" of the Teague majority in
sufficient control to muster a majority in cases involving retroactivity. 79 In But-
ler v. McKellar,8 0 Chief Justice Rehnquist turned his hand to the question of
71. Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2945. This part of Justice O'Connor's opinion was joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
72. Id. at 2963-69. (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[lit challenges the imagination to think that today's
result is 'dictated' by our prior cases. Indeed, if there is any available contention that our prior cases
compelled a particular result, it is the contention that petitioner's claim was considered and rejected
by Jurek v. Texas." Id. at 2965 (Scalia, I., dissenting) (citation omitted)).
73. Id. at 2964-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 2964 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1072).
75. Id. at 2965 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It is rare that a principle of law as significant as that in Teague
is adopted and gutted in the same Term.").
78. E-g., Recent Development" The Court Declines in Fairness-Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct.
1060, 25 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 164, 176 (1990) ("The Court's single post-Teague application of
the Teague bar reveals that even for the Court that created the new test, the meaning of a rule
'dictated from prior constitutional rules' is unclear.").
79. Both cases involved majorities consisting of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White,
O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, with Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens in dissent.
See Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990); Saflle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990).
80. 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990).
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what constituted a new rule; in Saffle v. Parks,81 Justice Kennedy added a fur-
ther gloss on the issue.
Butler involved a challenge to the use at trial of a murder confession ob-
tained during the course of a police interrogation conducted after police knew
that the defendant had retained counsel on an unrelated assault charge.82
Although police had read Butler his Mirandas3 rights and had obtained a
waiver with regard to questioning about the murder, Butler initially argued that
Edwards v. Arizona 8 4 required the police to refrain from all questioning once an
accused invoked his right to counsel on any charge.85 Faced with Butler's peti-
tion for habeas corpus, both the district court86 and the Fourth Circuit rejected
this claim on its merits and dismissed the petition.87
On the same day that the Fourth Circuit denied Butler's requests for re-
hearing and rehearing en banc, however, the Supreme Court decided Arizona v.
Roberson.88 Roberson held that the fifth amendment bars police-initiated inter-
rogation if a suspect has already requested counsel in a separate investigation. 9
Based on Roberson, Butler petitioned the Fourth Circuit for reconsideration,
and the original Fourth Circuit panel held that he was not entitled to a retroac-
tive application of the Roberson rule.90 Butler then brought his case to the
Supreme Court.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and
Kennedy, began with the threshold inquiry of whether the decision in Roberson
should be termed a "new rule" or should be considered an extension of the
Court's earlier decision in Edwards.91 Counsel for Butler argued that Roberson
was not novel because it fell within the "'logical compass'" of Edwards, advo-
cating a broad view of when one holding is "dictated" by another.92 Rejecting
this argument, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that if there were reasonable disa-
greement among courts--or even among attorneys-as to the outcome of a case,
it was not dictated by existing precedent and the ensuing decision announced a
81. 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990).
82. Butler, 110 S.'Ct. at 1214-15.
83. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (custodial interrogation not accompanied by cer-
tain warnings constitutes proscribed compulsion within the meaning of the fifth amendment).
84. 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (once accused has invoked the right to counsel, police must refrain
from further interrogation until counsel has been made available).
85. Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1215.
86. See id. The district court opinion is unpublished. Butler's petition was dismissed on the
state's motion for summary judgment.
87. Butler v. Aiken, 846 F.2d 255 (4th Cir. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct.
1212 (1990).
88. 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
89. Id. at 677-78.
90. Butler v. Aiken, 864 F.2d 24, 25 (4th Cir. 1988), affld sub nor. Butler v. McKellar, 110 S.
Ct. 1212 (1990).
91. Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1216-18 (1990).
92. Id. at 1217 (quoting transcript of oral argument). Butler's claim that Roberson did not state
a new rule but was compelled by Edwards was buttressed by the fact that Justice Stevens, writing for
the majority in Roberson, described the state's position as "ask[ing] us to craft an exception to that
[Edwards] rule for cases in which the police want to interrogate a suspect about an offense that is




"new rule."' 93 Accordingly, given the previous existence of a split among the
circuits on the issue of interrogation, Roberson stated a new rule for purposes of
retroactivity analysis.
94
Chief Justice Rehnquist then considered whether the Roberson rule fell
within either of the two Teague exceptions. 95 Recognizing the obvious fact that
Roberson did not place individual conduct beyond the reach of regulation, Chief
Justice Rehnquist proceeded to explain that Roberson did not meet the criteria
of the second exception either.9 6 Cautioning against undue reliance on the
Palko "ordered liberty" standard when applying the second exception, Chief
Justice Rehnquist focused instead on whether Roberson increased the likelihood
of an accurate determination. 97 He wryly concluded that "[b]ecause a violation
of Roberson's added restrictions on police investigatory procedures would not
seriously diminish the likelihood of obtaining an accurate determination-in-
deed, it may increase that likelihood-.. .Roberson did not establish any princi-
ple that would come within the second exception." 98
In Butler, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion both expanded the
definition of a "new rule" and significantly restricted the second Teague excep-
tion. It achieved the former result by narrowing the Court's understanding of
when one rule dictates another9 9 and accomplished the latter result by stressing
that only rules that enhanced the accuracy of outcomes would fall within its
purview. As the Chief Justice explained, the effect of this position was to vali-
date "reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state
courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions." 1° ° In
93. Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1217-18. Chief Justice Rehnquist was at some pains to explain that
the fact that a court says that its decision is within the "logical compass" of an earlier
decision, or indeed that it is "controlled" by a prior decision, is not conclusive for purposes
of deciding whether the current decision is a "new rule" under Teague... . That the
outcome in Roberson was susceptible to debate among reasonable minds is evidenced fur-
ther by the differing positions taken by the judges of the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth
and Seventh Circuits .... It would not have been an illogical or even a grudging applica-
tion of Edwards to decide that it did not extend to the facts of Roberson.
Id. The extreme quality of Chief Justice Rehnquist's statement almost appears to respond to the
challenge implicit in Justice Brennan's statement in his Teague dissent that "[v]irtually no case that
prompts a dissent on a relevant legal point, for example, could be said to be 'dictated' by prior
decisions." Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1088 (Brennan, I., dissenting).




98. Id. It would seem that if the Chief Justice's logic were followed, most rules aimed at re-
stricting police activity would fall outside the Teague exceptions.
99. Id. at 1216-18; cf. id. at 1221-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (The majority definition of nov-
elty "betrays a vision of adjudication fundamentally at odds with any this Court has previously
recognized.").
100. Id. at 1217. It is here that Chief Justice Rehnquist cryptically refers to the parallel between
the Teague rule and the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule by means of a "cf" citation to
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918-19 (1984), which describes the Leon holding in the follow-
ing terms: "assuming the exclusionary rule 'effectively deters some police misconduct and provides
incentives for the law enforcement profession as a whole to conduct itself in accord with the Fourth
Amendment, it cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law
enforcement activity.'" Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1217 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 918-19). But see id. at
1223 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing Leon analogy as "unsound").
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essence, the Butler Court created a good-faith exception to the application of
constitutional rules in habeas corpus.
In dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the majority opinion entailed an
improperly constricted understanding of the meaning of "prevailing law" at any
given time, a view so narrow as to be at odds with any previous understanding of
adjudication. 10 1 Justice Brennan also took issue with the majority's attempt to
insulate state court decisions, contending that the deterrent aim of habeas
corpus review was not merely to encourage state courts to decide cases reason-
ably, but to encourage them to decide cases correctly. 102 Justice Brennan re-
marked that under the majority regime, "a state prisoner can secure habeas
relief only by showing that the state court's rejection of the constitutional chal-
lenge was so clearly invalid under then-prevailing standards that the decision
could not be defended by any reasonable jurist."'103 Indeed, Justice Brennan
warned that the very function of habeas corpus was undercut when federal
courts were forced to pay deference to the federal constitutional rulings of the
state courts.°
4
Butler's companion case, Saffle v. Parks,10 5 involved a challenge to the
Oklahoma capital sentencing scheme on behalf of an inmate whose conviction
became final in 1983. Parks argued that the Oklahoma court's instruction in the
penalty phase of his trial violated the eighth amendment, claiming that the trial
court's instruction to "'avoid any influence of sympathy, sentiment, passion,
prejudice, or other arbitrary factor'" caused jurors to disregard his mitigating
evidence. 10 6 After an unsuccessful direct appeal, 10 7 and an equally unsuccessful
attempt at state postconviction relief, Parks filed a petition for federal habeas
corpus relief, arguing, inter alia, that the jury instructions were infirm.108 The
district court denied the petition"' 9 and a divided panel of the Tenth Circuit
affimed that decision. 110 On rehearing, the Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, re-
versed and held that the antisympathy instruction was unconstitutional for the
reasons advanced by Parks."'
101. Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1222 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated:
In Justice Harlan's view, adjudication according to prevailing law demands that a court
exhibit "conceptual faithfulness" to the principles underlying prior precedents, not just
"decisional obedience" to precise holdings based upon their unique factual patterns. The
inability of lower courts to predict significant reformulations by this Court of the principles
underlying prior precedents does not excuse them from the obligation to draw reasoned
conclusions from principles that are well established at the time of their decisions.
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
102. Id. at 1223 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 1219 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 1224-25 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
105. 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990).
106. Id. at 1259 (quoting transcript of jury instruction).
107. Parks v. State, 651 P.2d 686 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983).
108. Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1259. The district court opinion is unpublished.
109. Id.
110. Parks v. Brown, 840 F.2d 1496 (10th Cir.), rev'd, 860 F.2d 1545 (10th Cir. 1988) (en bane),
rev'd sub nom Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990).
111. Parks v. Brown, 860 F.2d 1545 (10th Cir. 1988) (en bane), rev'd sub nom. Saffle v. Parks,
110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990).
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Writing for a majority of the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy reversed the
Tenth Circuit en banc decision, further exploring the meaning of a "new rule"
for purposes of retroactivity in habeas corpus review. 1 2 Justice Kennedy char-
acterized Parks's argument as contending that "the Eighth Amendment, as in-
terpreted in 1983, required, and still requires, that jurors be allowed to base the
sentencing decision upon the sympathy they feel for the defendant after hearing
his mitigating evidence."' 13 The Court explained that this would be a new rule
since, unlike earlier precedent that prescribed "what mitigating evidence the jury
must be permitted to consider," the rule advocated by Parks would have pre-
scribed "how it must consider the mitigating evidence."
114
Parks constituted another vote in favor of a broad definition of a "new rule"
for purposes of retroactivity. Rejecting Justice O'Connor's narrow reading of
novelty in Penry, Justice Kennedy held that a rule was "new" as long as it could
be described as logically distinct from the existing precedent from which it was
derived and had been the subject of disagreement among the lower courts.
1 5
Having done so, Justice Kennedy quickly passed over the question of whether
the Parks rule as construed by the majority would have fallen within either of
the Teague exceptions, concluding that it neither regulated primary conduct nor
had the "primacy and centrality of the rule adopted in Gideon."116 Echoing
Chief Justice Rehnquist's tone in Butler, Justice Kennedy pointed out that
[t]he objectives of fairness and accuracy are more likely to be
threatened than promoted by a rule allowing the sentence to turn not
on whether the defendant, in the eyes of the community, is morally
deserving of the death sentence, but on whether the defendant can
strike an emotional chord within a juror."
17
Less than four months after the decisions in Butler and Parks, in Sawyer v.
Smith, 1 8 the Court once again attempted to clarify the elements of the Teague
test for retroactivity. In Sawyer, petitioner challenged the propriety of the pros-
ecutor's comments during the penalty phase of his capital trial, arguing that
those remarks violated the Supreme Court's decision in Caldwell v. Missis-
112. Saffle v. Parks, 1 0 S. Ct. at 1259-63. The application of Teague's nonretroactivity analysis
to the Parks case was not briefed by either side, but was raised sua sponte by the Court. Id. at 1264
n.l (Brennan, J., dissenting). Cf. Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1221 n.3 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("[E]lsewhere the Court practically trips over itself in evident haste to employ the
broadest possible definition of a 'new rule.' ").
113. Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1260.
114. Id. at 1261.
115. Id. at 1259-63. The Parks result is particularly disquieting in light of California v. Brown,
479 U.S. 538 (1987), decided after Parks's conviction became final and discussed in Parks. Parks,
110 S. Ct. at 1263. In Brown, the Court held constitutionally infirm an instruction telling the jurors
not to be swayed by "'mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or
public feeling.' "Brown, 479 U.S. at 542. While the phrasing is slightly different, it is apparent that
Mr. Parks is likely to meet his death for the lack of the adjective "mere."
116. Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1264. The Court was referring to the right to counsel decision in
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
117. Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1264.
118. 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990). Justice Kennedy once again wrote for a fivejustice majority includ-
ing Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice Marshall filed a dissent-
ing opinion in which Justice Brennan joined and in which Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined in
part. Id. at 2822 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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sippi,119 a case decided over a year after Sawyer's conviction became final. Cald-
well restricted the range of permissible prosecution comment during the penalty
phase of a capital case, barring arguments that might mislead the jury about its
role in the sentencing decision and create the possibility that the jury would
make that decision without an appropriate sense of responsibility. 120
Sawyer argued to the Fifth Circuit 12 1 that Caldwell was not novel because
the rule was dictated by existing state precedent, which was itself based on both
state and federal law, and because the Fifth Circuit had already held Caldwell
not to be novel in a case in which it had refused to excuse a procedural de-
fault.122 After weighing the implications of the Supreme Court's existing inter-
pretations of novelty, the Sawyer v. Butler majority rejected both arguments.
First, the majority refused to apply the procedural default standard-which re-
quires an attorney to raise a claim which might reasonably have been known to
him or risk losing the claim altogether on habeas-to the context of retroactiv-
ity. Instead, the majority placed Sawyer in a cruel dilemma: if Caldwell enunci-
ated a more stringent rule than its due process based predecessor, Donnelly v.
DeChristoforo,123 then Caldwell was a "new rule" because it was not dictated by
Donnelly; if it did not, then Sawyer could not make out a violation of Cald-
well.12 4 In effect, the Fifth Circuit found that Caldwell was "new" based on
Sawyer's own argument that the Caldwell decision extended further than Don-
nelly. 125 Having held that the rule in Caldwell was new, a majority of the Fifth
Circuit then found simply that it did not fit within either of the Teague excep-
tions.126 In dissent, however, five judges argued that Caldwell was not novel,
but merely fulfilled the promise of earlier constitutional decisions, 127 and in any
event, fell within the second Teague exception for watershed procedural rules.
Illustrating the division among the lower federal courts regarding the applica-
tion of retroactivity analysis to cases claiming the benefits of Caldwell, only a
few months after the Fifth Circuit decision, the Tenth Circuit, also sitting en
119. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
120. Id. at 337-40. The type of argument condemned in Caldwell is familiarly called "the last
word argument" because the prosecutor tells the jury that its word will not be the last word causing
the defendant's execution, but will be reviewed by many other courts. See Hill v. Black, 887 F.2d
513, 517-18 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 28 (1990). To establish a Caldwell violation,
however, the defendant must demonstrate that the "remarks to the jury improperly described the
role assigned to the jury by local law." Dugger v. Adams, 109 S. Ct. 1211, 1215 (1989).
121. Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d 1273 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc), aff'd sub nora. Sawyer v. Smith,
110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990).
122. Sawyer, 881 F.2d at 1291 (citing Moore v. Blackburn, 774 F.2d 97, 98 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1176 (1986)).
123. 416 U.S. 637 (1974) (prejudice to defendant necessary for prosecutor's improper remarks to
violate due process).
124. Sawyer, 881 F.2d at 1279, 1284-85, 1293-94. Sawyer was unable to prove a claim under
Donnelly because he could not demonstrate the prejudice necessary under Donnelly's fundamental
fairness standard. Id. at 1294.
125. Id. at 1290-91.
126. Id. at 1291-92.
127. Id. at 1296-1305 (King, J., dissenting). The dissent relied on the decision in Penry to argue
that Caldwell merely fulfilled the promise of a variety of earlier decisions in the death penalty con-
text and therefore did not state a new rule. Id. at 1297-98.
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bane, held in Hopkinson v. Shillinger 2 8 that Caldwell was new, but that it fell
within the second Teague exception because its rule implicated the accuracy of
jury determinations.
129
In Hopkinson, the Tenth Circuit was deeply troubled by the question of
whether Caldwell had announced a new rule, remarking that its "initial im-
pulse" suggested that "it is not a novel constitutional idea that a jury should
understand its role and responsibility in a capital sentencing proceeding."
130
The court, however, felt itself bound by another line of its own precedent which
held that a Caldwell claim could be raised for the first time in federal habeas
review because the issue was so novel that trial counsel could not reasonably
have been expected to anticipate it.131 The court resisted the temptation to ar-
gue that the standard of novelty in the procedural default situation was different
from the standard of novelty in the context of retroactivity, finding the two stan-
dards to be fundamentally alike.' 3 2 Indeed, the court recalled that precedent
had seemed to point away from the result in Caldwell and had to be "specifically
addressed and distinguished in Caldwell."' 33 As the Tenth Circuit recalled,
Woodson v. North Carolina,134 the authority said to underlie Caldwell, was so
general as not to "compel" any specific result.
135
Having found Caldwell novel, the Hopkinson court strained to place Cald-
well within the second Teague exception. Although admitting that a rule that
limits comment about the availability of appellate review during the penalty
phase of a capital case is not a "bedrock" procedural rule within the meaning of
the eighth amendment, the court went on to say that, "speaking in the abstract,
and not as to the fact situation before us, it strikes us as a bedrock procedure
that a jury must understand that it, not the appellate court, carries the responsi-
bility for imposing the death penalty."' 36 The court then found instead that the
jury's understanding of its role was "fundamentally related" to the accuracy of
the death sentence; a misunderstanding would "dislocate" the entire purpose of
the proceeding, that of meeting the "'heightened need for reliability'" present
in capital sentencing.
13 7
The Sawyer v. Butler majority had already rejected this reasoning on the
ground that Sawyer's Caldwell claim had "neither the overwhelming influence
upon accuracy nor the intimate counection with factual innocence demanded by
128. 888 F.2d 1286 (10th Cir. 1989) (en bane), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 3526 (1990).
129. Id. at 1291-92.
130. Id. at 1288-89.
131. Id. at 1289 (citing Dutton v. Brown, 812 F.2d 593, 596 (10th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 836 (1987)).
132. Id. at 1290.
133. Id.
134. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
135. Hopkinson, 888 F.2d at 1290.
136. Id. at 1292.
137. Id. at 1290 (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 340 (1985) (quoting Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976))); cf. Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d at 1304 (King, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that Caldwell falls within the second Teague exception).
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the second Teague proviso."1 38 The majority's route to this conclusion, how-
ever, was convoluted and, as the dissenters observed, apparently confused the
showing necessary to prove that Sawyer's own sentence was distorted by the
prosecutor's argument-whether a Caldwell violation actually occurred-wAth
the showing necessary to demonstrate that Caldwell presented a rule implicating
the fundamental accuracy of the sentencing procedure. 139 In fact, the Fifth Cir-
cuit majority opinion provides a virtual roadmap to the pitfalls of discussing the
merits prior to considering retroactivity1 4° The court appears to have fallen
into this confusion because of its sub rosa use of the procedural default standard
as a guide to the application of Teague;14 1 the court argued that if a failure to
reach a Caldwell error in an individual case worked no "miscarriage of justice,"
then the rule enunciated in Caldwell could not be so intrinsically tied up with
fairness and accuracy to fall within the second exception. 142
The Supreme Court overlooked these, as well as other,143 difficulties raised
by the Fifth Circuit decision, holding that Caldwell was novel within the mean-
ing of Teague, did not fit within the Teague exceptions, and, therefore, was not
to be applied retroactively to cases on habeas review.1 4 Writing for the major-
ity, Justice Kennedy viewed retroactivity through the prism of the Butler
formula protecting the "'reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing
precedents made by state courts.' "145 Justice Kennedy first determined, as had
all the courts of appeals to address the issue, that Caldwell was not dictated by
already existing precedent, explaining simply that the Caldwell rule effected an
extension of existing federal constitutional doctrine that was not predictable by
the state courts.14 6
Having concluded that Caldwell was novel within the meaning of Teague,
Justice Kennedy next considered whether it fell within either of the Teague ex-
ceptions. Although there was little dispute that Caldwell did not come under
the first exception, 147 both the Tenth Circuit148 and a significant minority of the
138. Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d 1273, 1294 (5th Cir. 1989) (en bane), aff'd sub nom. Sawyer v.
Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990).
139. Id. at 1304 (King, J., dissenting):
To justify its conclusion that Caldwell does not satisfy Teague's second exception, the ma-
jority relies primarily on Dugger v. Adams, in which the Court held that refusing to con-
sider a petitioner's procedurally-barred Caldwell claim would not result in a "fundamental
miscarriage of justice." Acknowledging that Adams scrutinized "the facts of a particular
case, while the Teague-ordered liberty standard looks to the character of the general rule
asserted," the majority nonetheless dismisses this distinction as more semantic than
substantive.
Id. (citing Dugger v. Adams, 109 S. Ct. 1211 (1989)) (footnotes omitted).
140. Id. at 1281.
141. Id. at 1294 (noting that cause and prejudice requirement to excuse procedural bars may
itself be excused when the ends of justice so require).
142. Id.
143. See infra notes 147-56 and accompanying text.
144. Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2824-25 (1990).
145. Id. at 2827 (quoting Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1217 (1990)). Indeed, Justice
Kennedy suggested that the Court formulated the Teague definition of novelty in order to meet this
concern. Id.
146. Id. at 2828.
147. Id. at 2831 ("The first of these [exceptions] applies to new rules that place an entire cate-
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Fifth Circuit believed that Caldwell fell within the second exception because it
enhanced the reliability of capital sentencing.' 49 Indeed, Justice Kennedy him-
self strongly-and inexplicably, given the Court's ultimate position-empha-
sized that the Caldwell rule grew out of the Court's concern for reliability in the
capital sentencing process.1 50 Justice Kennedy, however, announced that en-
hancement of accuracy was not enough for the second exception; rather, a "rule
that qualifies under this [second] exception must not only improve accuracy, but
also 'alter our understanding of the bedrockprocedural elements' essential to the
fairness of the proceeding."' 15 ' As Justice Kennedy explained, the bedrock pro-
cedural element of fairness in prosecutorial comment was already established by
the due process based protections of Donnelly v. DeChristoforo. 152 Thus, Cald-
well did not effect a fundamental change in the legal community's understanding
of the bedrock procedural elements necessary to a fair and accurate determina-
tion, but merely added to existing procedural guarantees, thereby falling outside
Teague's second exception.' 5 3 Justice Kennedy's opinion is a curious one. Hav-
ing found Caldwell to be novel in the first place, Justice Kennedy was forced by
his own reasoning to argue that, in the final analysis, it was not novel enough to
be applied retroactively.
Indeed, Sawyer bore all the earmarks of an end-of-term opinion' 54 and
failed to confront many of the questions raised by the Fifth Circuit en banc
opinion under review.' 55 This is particularly unfortunate because Sawyer
presented the Court with its first opportunity to consider a case in which the
lower courts had specifically examined the difficulties presented by Teague and
in which there was a split among the circuits regarding the retroactivity of a
specific rule of law under Teague.156 Although the Supreme Court affirmed the
Fifth Circuit's result-and once again weighed in on behalf of an extremely ex-
pansive view of novelty and a restrictive reading of the Teague exceptions-the
Court's opinion afforded little additional guidance for the lower courts.
Indeed, if any guidance at all is to be drawn from the majority opinion, it is
that the Court's position is increasingly and explicitly determined by its desire to
uphold the reasonable, good faith constitutional decisions of the state courts
gory of primary conduct beyond the reach of the criminal law ... or new rules that prohibit imposi-
tion of a certain type of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense....
This exception has no application here." (citation omitted)).
148. Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 888 F.2d 1286, 1290 (10th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 3526 (1990).
149. Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d 1273, 1303-05 (5th Cir. 1989) (King, J., dissenting), aff'd sub
nom. Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. CL 2822 (1990).
150. Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2826-31.
151. Id. at 2831 (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, which itself was quoting Mackey v. United
States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
152. Id. at 2832 (citing Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642-48 (1974)).
153. Id. at 2832-33.
154. The decision was handed down on June 21, 1990, shortly before the end of the term. The
majority opinion was extremely brief, and roughly a quarter of its text was occupied by a discussion
of the unusually inflammatory facts of Sawyers crime and the procedural history of the case.
155. Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d 1273 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. Sawyer v. Smith,
110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990).
156. See supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
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even if those decisions fail to accord with subsequent federal constitutional
norms. As a result, the Court continues to be committed to an extremely broad
view of novelty and an extremely narrow view of the Teague exceptions. Almost
any decision handed down after a petitioner's conviction is final-and therefore
unavailable to the state courts at the time of conviction-fits within the Supreme
Court's view of novelty. In addition, it appears that only decisions which radi-
cally alter the legal terrain regarding procedural fairness and accuracy fit within
the second Teague exception as it is now formulated. It is ironic that the Court's
opinion in Sawyer implies that only decisions sufficiently disruptive of existing
constitutional norms to be nonretroactive under the pre-Teague regime would
now be retroactive under Teague.
Initially, the direction of the Court's post-Teague jurisprudence was uncer-
tain. The majority and the dissenters seemed poised in an uneasy balance, sus-
tained by Justice O'Connor's ability to reconcile her position in Penry with her
position in Butler and Parks.15 7 With the Sawyer decision, however, it is clear
that Penry, and not Butler, will be the constitutional dead end. A solid majority
of the Court has accepted Justice Harlan's view of retroactivity, with a five-
Justice majority committed to a definition of a "new rule" cast in terms of pro-
tecting the good faith constitutional adjudication of the state courts as of the
time the defendant's conviction has become final.158 Moreover, the same five-
Justice majority has narrowed the second Teague exception by stressing that a
rule must both enhance the accuracy of the trial court's determination and work
a major revision in the legal community's understanding of the bedrock proce-
dural interests necessary to a fair and just adjudication. Nevertheless, the pre-
cise contours and effects of the new retroactivity jurisprudence remain murky.
The task before the lower courts is to articulate and develop Teague doctrine in
order that its structure and significance may become clear.159
157. One commentator argues that Justice O'Connor's decisions are explicable in terms of her
analysis of the reliance interests of the lower courts; that is to say, a lower court acting in good faith
could not have applied the Texas statute in the manner challenged by Penry given the court's knowl-
edge of existing precedent. I J. LEBMAN, supra note 5, § 22A.1, at 109-12 (Supp. 1989).
158. Although it is too early to predict changes in the Court's direction due to the retirement of
Justice Brennan, it is fair to say that since Justice Brennan dissented in Teague, Saffle, Butler, and
Sawyer, his departure will either work no change in the majority position or will permit that position
to solidify further.
159. The Supreme Court has issued a handful of other decisions citing Teague or raising Teague
questions, but none of them evinces serious analysis of retroactivity concerns. See, e.g., Collins v.
Youngblood, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 2718 (1990) (one paragraph conclusorily stating Teague is not jurisdic-
tional in the sense that it must be raised sua sponte and that a Teague issue may be waived by the
state); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 110 S. Ct. 1717, 1737 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Teague
as an example of the "Court's unseemly effort to hasten executions at the cost of permitting constitu-
tional violations to go unrectified."); Swindler v. Lockhart, 110 S. Ct. 1938, 1940 (1990) (Marshall,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (stating that the Court's failure to address the constitutional-
ity of state change of venue rules that limit a trial court's ability to protect a defendant from the
effects of prejudicial publicity does not bar consideration of the claim on habeas corpus; even assum-
ing that the rule would be "new," it would fall within the second Teague exception because the
likelihood of an accurate trial is "no doubt diminished when a defendant is tried by a jury that has
prejudged his case"); McKoy v. North Carolina, 110 S. Ct. 1227, 1235 (1990) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring) (Teague cited as an example of the "unusual, but hardly unheard of" act of Supreme Court
deciding issues not briefed by the parties); Mallett v. Missouri, 110 S. Ct. 1308, 1310 (1990) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (rejecting state's claim that defendant's Batson argu-
ments were barred by Teague); Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 810 (1990) (discussing Teague in
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II. THE APPLICATION OF TEAGUE RETROACTIVITY ANALYSIS BY THE
LOWER FEDERAL COURTS
The application of Teague retroactivity analysis by the lower courts
presents the opportunity both to study the articulation of a new body of doctrine
and to take the measure of the Court's new retroactivity opinions. The first part
of this section provides an overview of the application of Teague analysis by the
lower courts. Here, it is significant to recognize that "new rule" issues arise in
two different contexts, the more common involving the application of rules de-
cided after the petitioner's conviction has become final-the classic retroactivity
situation-and the less common involving genuinely novel rules advocated by
the petitioner himself. The second part of this section discusses lower courts'
interpretation of the scope of Teague, their understanding of Teague's require-
ment that retroactivity be given threshold consideration, and the application of
the term "new rule" and the two Teague exceptions. While courts generally
have applied Teague broadly to find rules novel and to restrict consideration of
the merits of habeas claims, some courts have attempted to limit the reach of
Teague. The third part of this section analyzes the problems presented when
Teague's bar to the consideration of novel claims is combined with other proce-
dural doctrines in habeas corpus and concludes with a discussion of some at-
tempts to contain the reach of Teague.
A. Overview: The Likely Significance of Teague in the Articulation of Rules
of Criminal Procedure in the Federal Courts
According to reliable statistics, there are roughly twelve thousand petitions
for federal habeas corpus filed yearly on behalf of state and federal prisoners. 16°
The Supreme Court decided Teague in February 1989. In the next year and a
half, the lower federal courts cited Teague in approximately seventy-five
cases. 16 1 A good proportion of those citations, as might be expected, appear in
dicta. 162 Of the remaining cases, about one-third mention Teague in support of
the context of its finding that application of the sixth amendment fair cross-section rule does not
apply to the petit jury and would be a "new" rule); Zant v. Moore, 109 S. Ct. 1518 (1989) (vacating
and remanding an Eleventh Circuit opinion for reconsideration in the light of Teague). For a discus-
sion of Zant on remand, see infra note 300 and accompanying text.
160. Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States, March 14, 1989,
and September 20, 1989; 1989 Din. ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS ANr. REP. 181 (showing
12,372 petitions for federal habeas corpus in 1989 as opposed to 25,957 civil rights actions on behalf
of prisoners); see also Weisselberg, Evidentiary Hearings in Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 1990
B.Y.U. L. REv. 131, 160-65. Weisselberg finds that habeas corpus filings per state prisoner remained
fairly constant from 1945 to 1962, rose dramatically until 1970, and have steadily declined since
1970. In fiscal year 1945, Weisselberg found 0.47 federal habeas petitions filed for every 100 state
prisoners; in 1961, there were 0.52; in 1970, 5.05; in 1988, 1.85. Id. at 162-63. If true, it would seem
that the Supreme Court's efforts to protect state court adjudications bore fruit well before Teague.
See, e.g., id. at 164.
161. While this study has no pretensions to statistical accuracy, particularly since the number of
cases involved will be increasing even during the time between writing and pmblication, it is likely
that the proportions discussed fairly predict how the cases will divide, at least for the foreseeable
future, given no significant shifts in doctrine or personnel. In addition, the numbers and proportions
are useful as background and to give a sense of context to the debate.
162. See e.g., United States v. France, 886 F.2d 223, 227 (9th Cir. 1989), cert granted, 110 S.
Ct. 1921 (1990).
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propositions concerning procedural bars to claims being raised by petitioners
rather than as authority regarding retroactivity.1 63 Although it is early to draw
absolute conclusions about the significance of Teague, it appears that retroactiv-
ity analysis plays a less central role in the disposition of existing habeas corpus
petitions than might have been expected. 164
In addition, one of the chief criticisms of Teague is that its retroactivity
analysis will retard the development of constitutional rules of criminal proce-
dure in the federal courts. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Teague, argued that
the plurality decision would
for the first time preclude the federal courts from considering on col-
lateral review a vast range of important constitutional challenges;
where those challenges have merit, it would bar the vindication of per-
sonal constitutional rights and deny society a check against further vi-
olations until the same claim is presented on direct review.
165
Although Teague has the potential to limit the development of new rules of
constitutional criminal procedure, this possibility may well be overstated.
166
Under Teague, the issue of novelty actually arises in two different contexts.
In the first, the petitioner attempts to have the habeas court announce a genu-
inely novel rule of law in his case. In the second, the petitioner seeks the benefit
of a rule which has already been decided but which was not available until after
his conviction became final. Before Teague, courts generally announced a rule
in one case and then considered its retroactivity in a second, when a petitioner
163. In effect, these cases cite Teague for the position taken by the Court in Harris v. Reed, 109
S. Ct. 1038 (1989), rather than for the Teague plurality's position regarding retroactivity. While the
issue of procedural bars is beyond the scope of this study, it is fair to say that of the two decisions,
Harris is likely to be the more significant because it permits state courts to insulate their decisions
even more completely than does the "good faith" rule of Teague. See supra note 4. The high pro-
portion of cases citing Teague for the Harris position and the low number of cases in which Teague
bars the discussion of genuinely novel issues of law tends to support this thesis.
164. Cf Bradley, Are State Courts Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: A Preliminary Study, 77
GEo. L.J. 251, 253 (1988) (arguing that although Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), withdrew
federal habeas jurisdiction over fourth amendment "claims," the decision has had little impact on
state enforcement of the fourth amendment).
165. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1084 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1088-90 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (listing 18 important new constitutional rules that were announced in habeas corpus
review); Recent Developments" The Court Declines in Fairness--Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 25
H.xv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rnv. 164, 164 n.4 (1990) (discussing the new rules of constitutional criminal
procedure first announced in habeas corpus review).
166. As discussed supra note 160, earlier decisions of the Supreme Court restricting the availabil-
ity of habeas relief have already cut down the absolute numbers of habeas filings by state prisoners
and, consequently, the issues considered on habeas review. Indeed, it may be argued that the
problems of procedural bars are far more significant in reducing the issues developed in habeas
review.
If this observation is borne out, Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038 (1989) (applying the "plain
statement rule" of Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) to habeas corpus proceedings), will be
the more significant decision from the standpoint of restricting the availability of habeas review for
novel constitutional claims. It is also reasonable to assume that the focus of habeas corpus litigation
will shift further from the merits and will become even more directed toward procedural issues. If
nonretroactivity does not have the disastrous effect that has been predicted, it will be largely because
the majority of claims were procedurally barred. While this does not speak well for the reach of
habeas corpus, at least it shows where the focus of the debate ought to be placed. See Yackle,
Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 991, 1056-57 (1985) (discussing effect of state proce-
dural bars in habeas corpus proceedings).
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sought the benefit of the already-decided rule. Teague's strongest break with
prior doctrine lies in its blanket preclusion of the announcement of "new rules"
on collateral attack. Its position regarding the retroactivity of already decided
rules is by and large an extension of existing doctrine regarding retroactivity,
albeit with a radically altered definition of "novelty." While both developments
limit the issues that the lower federal courts may consider in habeas review, it is
presumably the blanket preclusion that will have the greatest effect on new doc-
trine. The redefinition of retroactivity may retard the incremental articulation
of doctrine, but reason suggests it is unlikely to work as radical an effect as a
complete bar.
Because many of the cases examined for this study were initiated before the
Teague decision, there should be little, if any dissuasive effect on the types of
claims raised by petitioners as a result of the preclusive rule. Yet, only a handful
of cases presented a situation in which lower courts found themselves forced to
refuse to consider genuinely novel questions of law.16 7 Instead, as might be ex-
pected, the majority of Teague questions revolved around a "genuine" issue of
retroactivity; that is, whether to give petitioner the benefit of a rule of law that
the Supreme Court had decided in an unrelated case after petitioner's conviction
became final. 16s
In fact, it is likely that the primary effect of Teague will be seen in the
process of direct appeal. As Justice Brennan conceded, all federal constitutional
claims that Teague might bar if first brought on habeas are cognizable in the
federal system if brought on direct appeal. 169 Thus, the informed advocate is
now obliged to raise and preserve every colorable federal constitutional issue
both at trial and on direct appeal. In state criminal cases, the direct appeal
certiorari petition to the Supreme Court may be a criminal defendant's only
opportunity to secure relief from a federal court on a novel claim of federal
167. Of the cases reviewed, only four or five presented what might be termed genuinely innova-
tive legal theories. See Callaghan v. United States, 895 F.2d 1412 (unpublished opinion) (6th Cir.
1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, 6CIR fie) (petitioner requesting retroactive application of the federal
sentencing guidelines in order to reduce his sentence); Newlon v. Armontrout, 885 F.2d 1328, 1331-
33 (8th Cir. 1989) (whether an instruction in a capital sentencing proceeding to the effect that it was
an aggravating factor if the crime was the result of "depravity of mind" was too vague to pass
constitutional muster, held by the court not to be a "new rule"), cert. denied sub nom. Delo v.
Newlon, 110 S. Ct. 3301 (1990); Byrd v. Delo, 733 F. Supp. 1334, 1338 (E.D. Mo. 1990) (arguing
that exclusion of character evidence at trial precluded consideration of mitigating factors at capital
sentencing phase); United States ex rel. Silagy v. Peters, 713 F. Supp. 1246, 1251 (C.D. Inl. 1989)
(exclusion of people over seventy years of age from jury venire does not create constitutional viola-
tion, but if it did, could not be applied retroactively under Teague), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub
nor. Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986 (7th Cir. 1990).
168. The majority of these cases consider the retroactivity of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S.
320 (1985), which restricted permissible comment by prosecution regarding jury role in capital sen-
tencing proceeding, a matter settled by the Court's decision in Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822
(1990). See, eg., Gomez v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2237, 2248 (1989) (reversible error for federal
magistrates to conduct jury selection in felony trials); Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1043 (1989)
(applying the "plain statement" rule of Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), to habeas corpus
proceedings); Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 188 (1987) (excluding defendant's own confession,
corroborating that of his codefendant, when introduced against him); see supra notes 150-56 and
accompanying text.
169. Teague, 109 S. CL at 1085 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see supra note 163 and accompanying
text.
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constitutional law. Because of this, counsel preparing a petition for certiorari in
a direct appeal from a state conviction will be obliged to present-and the
Supreme Court may well be obliged to consider-every potential novel constitu-
tional claim. The effect of nonretroactivity in habeas on the Court's docket is
likely to be quite the reverse of what the Teague plurality intended.
B. The Development of Teague Analysis by the Lower Federal Courts
Even if Teague does not deter the development of genuinely novel rules of
constitutional procedure to the degree anticipated, lower courts still must regu-
larly apply retroactivity analysis to petitions which present claims based on af-
ter-decided cases. As the lower courts work at elaborating Teague, a number of
questions present themselves: (1) does Teague apply to petitions for habeas
corpus on behalf of federal prisoners; (2) how can retroactivity be considered a
threshold issue; (3) what is a "new rule"; (4) what is the scope of the Teague
exceptions; and (5) what is the reach of Teague itself. There have been sugges-
tions, in dissenting opinions and in academic commentary, that the Teague deci-
sion contained sufficient play to permit courts to limit its effect through creative
answers to these questions.1 70 Yet, almost uniformly, the lower courts-even if
expressing bewilderment at the Supreme Court's own disagreements-have re-
fused to take this course. Instead, they largely have followed the "hard core"
Teague justices, holding most claims to be novel and to fall outside the Teague
exceptions.
1. Application of Teague Retroactivity Analysis to Collateral Attacks on
Both Federal and State Convictions
In his Teague dissent, Justice Brennan observed that the plurality did not
decide whether its retroactivity analysis extended to claims brought by prisoners
collaterally attacking federal convictions. 171 Indeed, insofar as Teague (and its
progeny) focused on the protection of state court reliance interests, it might well
be argued that Teague ought not to apply to federal convictions. 172 At the same
time, Teague emphasized finality, equality of treatment for those similarly situ-
170. See, eg., Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1084 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Sawyer v. Butler, 881
F.2d at 1279-81; 1 J. LMBMAN, supra note 5, § 22A.1, at 85-126 (Supp. 1989).
171. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1084 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Prisoners sentenced by a federal
court may collaterally attack their convictions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988), the federal habeas
corpus statute. Federal review of state convictions and sentences is provided under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(1988).
172. See Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1075 (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor's opinion stated:
The "costs imposed upon the State[s] by retroactive application of new rules of consti-
tutional law on habeas corpus... generally far outweigh the benefits of this application."
In many ways the application of new rules to cases on collateral review may be more
intrusive than the enjoining of criminal prosecutions, for it continually forces the States to
marshall resources in order to keep in prison defendants whose trials and appeals con-
formed to then-existing constitutional standards. Furthermore, as we recognized in Engle
v. Isaac, [456 U.S. 107 (1982)] "[s]tate courts are understandably frustrated when they
faithfully apply existing constitutional law only to have a federal court discover, during a
[habeas] proceeding, new constitutional commands."
Id. (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
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ated, and avoidance of unnecessary constitutional adjudication, concerns which
are presented by collateral attacks on either state or federal convictions. The
lower federal courts have been relatively untroubled by the distinctions between
collateral review of state and federal convictions. 173 Only a few courts have
explicitly considered the distinction with an eye to retroactivity; 174 all applied
Teague to habeas review of federal convictions. 17 5 Those courts that discussed
the issue stressed the overriding importance of finality in the criminal law.'7 6
The others simply adopted Teague sub silentio.
7 7
In another era, Justice Brennan's observation might have provided an ad-
venturous lower court with a vehicle for the limitation of Teague. However,
given the direction of current Supreme Court decisions, Teague's application to
collateral review of federal convictions could be classified as a predictable non-
issue.
178
2. Retroactivity as a Threshold Issue
When Teague was first decided, courts and commentators expressed uncer-
tainty both about the Court's intention to treat retroactivity as a threshold issue
in habeas corpus review 179 and about the meaning of "threshold" considera-
173. The similarity between §§ 2254 and 2255 is well established. Kaufman v. United States,
394 U.S. 217, 225-227 (1969). "[W]hen a request for relief under § 2255 asserts a claim ... the
§ 2255 court need not stop to review the adequacy of the procedure established by [the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure]. In this respect, and in this respect only, the position of the federal prisoner
does differ from that of the state prisoner." Id. at 227; cf. United States v. Williams, 615 F.2d 585,
591 (3d Cir. 1980) ("[G]iven the similarity between section 2254 and section 2255 actions and the
Court's attempt to provide similar relief under each, the logic of the Supreme Court's recent pro-
nouncements in the section 2254 may well carry over into section 2255 cases.").
174. E.g., Hrubec v. United States, 734 F. Supp. 60, 65 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
175. See, eg., Kaufinan, 394 U.S. at 225-27; Williams, 615 F.2d at 591-93.
176. Kaufman, 394 U.S. at 228; Williams, 615 F.2d at 591. The Hrubec court stated:
Policy, too, dictates Teague's application since concerns of finality are just as present here
in this collateral attack on a federal conviction as they were in Teague.... The goal of
finality would be thwarted if every new rule of criminal procedure could potentially lead to
the collateral overturning of an otherwise valid conviction.
Hrubec, 734 F. Supp. at 65.
177. See, eg., United States v. Ayala, 894 F.2d 425, 429 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (assuming that
Teague's "painstakingly formulated 'retroactivity' rules" are applicable to § 2255 proceedings);
United States v. Lopez-Pena, 890 F.2d 490, 493 n.3 (Ist Cir. 1989) (same); United States v. Muller,
733 F. Supp. 1392, 1394 (D. Haw. 1990) (applying Teague to a collateral attack on a federal convic-
tion); United States v. Makaweo, 730 F. Supp. 1016, 1017 (D. Haw. 1990) (same); United States v.
Baron, 721 F. Supp. 259, 261 (D. Haw. 1989) (same); United States v. Rubio, 722 F. Supp. 77, 84-85
(D. Del. 1989) (same), aff'd without opinion, 908 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1990).
178. Cf. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 (1982). The Engle Court stated:
Respondents, finally, urge that we should replace or supplement the cause-and-preju-
dice standard with a plain-error inquiry. We rejected this argument when pressed by a
federal prisoner and find it no more compelling here. Federal habeas challenges to state
convictions, however, entail greater finality problems and special comity concerns.
Id. (citation omitted).
179. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d 1273, 1280 (5th Cir. 1989) (en bane) ("It remains
unclear... whether Teague necessarily operates as a threshold barrier preempting full analysis of
the constitutional claims asserted. The Teague plurality clearly thought that a Teague bar would
preempt discussion of the constitutional merits."), aff'd sub nom. Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822
(1990).
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tion. °80 According to the Teague plurality, not only was retroactivity "properly
treated as a threshold question," but the habeas court should address the ques-
tion of "whether such a rule would be applied retroactively" before deciding
whether the rule was constitutionally compelled.' 8 1 In effect, the plurality as-
serted that in order to avoid rendering advisory opinions, courts should refrain
from exploring the constitutional claims asserted by the petitioner if the rule
advocated would be "new" within the meaning of Teague.18 2 The plurality ap-
parently expected courts to decide whether a rule would be novel without reach-
ing the precise nature of the rule or the constitutional merits.
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens questioned whether such a decision was
possible, arguing that the plurality "inverts the proper order of adjudication."1 8 3
As Justice Stevens observed, "until a rule is set forth, it would be extremely
difficult to evaluate whether a rule is 'new' at all."'814 Instead, Justice Stevens
suggested that retroactivity analysis proceed by "[f]irst determining whether the
trial process violated any of the petitioner's constitutional rights and then decid-
ing whether the petitioner is entitled to relief."' 8s5
Not only was the viability of the plurality approach at issue, but initially
courts also had to contend with the uncertain precedential value of the plurality
position.' 8 6 Only Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy joined the
part of the plurality opinion describing the threshold consideration of retroactiv-
ity. Although Justices Stevens and Blackmun had endorsed the adoption of a
new retroactivity standard, they explicitly distanced themselves from this aspect
of the plurality's reasoning. 187 Justice White also declined to join the relevant
portion of the plurality opinion, leaving his own view on the issue unclear.
The Court's subsequent opinion in Penry v. Lynaugh 188 did little to clarify
180. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1079 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment). Professor Liebman takes up Justice Stevens's position, arguing that habeas courts first should
consider whether a rule is constitutionally compelled before deciding whether it would be retroac-
tive. I J. LIEBMAN, supra note 5, § 22A.1, at 93-97 (Supp. 1989). Liebman contends that advisory
opinions are inevitable under the plurality opinion and that Justice Stevens's approach avoids many
of these problems, as well as permitting the habeas court to consider certain claims that do not arise
until the process of direct review is completed. Id. Liebman also states that the plurality restriction
will "have a dramatic impact on the legislative definition of both the habeas corpus enterprise and
the jurisdiction of lower federal judges" who "would be relegated to the nearly ministerial task of
putting into operation decisions that the Supreme Court renders on direct review." Id. at 96 (Supp.
1989).
181. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1069-70.
182. Id. at 1070, 1077-78.
183. Id. at 1079 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice
Blackmun joined Justice Stevens on this issue.
184. Id. at 1079 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
185. Id. at 1079 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
186. See I J. LIBMAN, supra note 5, § 22A.1, at 92 (Supp. 1989). Professor Liebman states:
Although the Teague plurality is at pains to characterize its approach to the proper
order of decision as a "hold[ing]," the uncertain status of the plurality view is revealed both
by the fact that four Justices expressly rejected the plurality approach and a fifth (Justice
White) expressed no view and by the fact that the plurality concedes that its so-called
"hold[ing]" is only "implicit."
Id.
187. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
188. 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
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the matter. The entire Court subscribed to a passage in Justice O'Connor's opin-
ion announcing that "[u]nder Teague, we address the retroactivity issue as a
threshold matter,"' 8 9 but the significance of this vote was unclear.1 90 In his
concurrence, Justice Stevens repeated his view that the habeas court should con-
sider the constitutionality of the rule before addressing its retroactivity. 19 1 Jus-
tice O'Connor herself mixed the inquiry concerning novelty with a discussion of
the merits, 192 and Justice Scalia admitted in dissent that the merits of the consti-
tutional claim and its novelty are "obviously interrelated."'
193
Surprisingly, the apparent difficulties of giving threshold consideration to
retroactivity have not particularly disturbed the lower courts. Few even have
mentioned the problems raised by Justice Stevens. One of those few, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc in Sawyer v. Butler,194" displayed some
of the fragmentation of the Supreme Court itself.'19  In Sawyer, Judge Higgin-
botham's majority opinion argued that Teague's strict segregation of retroactiv-
ity analysis from the constitutional merits was unrealistic. 196 Fortified by
Teague's then uncertain authority, Judge Higginbotham explicitly chose to ad-
dress the merits of Sawyer's constitutional claim before deciding the issue of
retroactivity. 1
97
Judge Higginbotham also alluded to the difficulties arising from Teague's
failure to distinguish between cases which present facially novel issues and cases
which rely on "a rule that is new by comparison to... [the petitioner's] own
conviction yet is well established by the time of his habeas petition."'198 The
Teague plurality opinion was largely conceived in terms of genuinely novel is-
sues. As Judge Higginbotham suggested, the plurality's concerns are far less
apposite when the rule is already established; such cases do not risk the "awk-
ward outcome"'199 of creating a new rule in a case in which it is then inapplica-
ble. Hence, it ought to be less troubling, even from the plurality's perspective, to
mingle the merits with the issue of novelty when the petitioner is attempting to
seek the benefit of an after-decided case.
No court has accepted the Fifth Circuit majority view, but as a practical
matter, many courts act in accord with its position. When a petitioner is claim-
189. Id. at 2952.
190. See Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d 1273, 1281 (5th Cir. 1989) (en bane) ("We must take care
not to overstate the significance of these votes."), aff'd sub nom. Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822
(1990); supra note 54.
191. Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2963 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
192. Id. at 294446.
193. Id. at 2964 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
194. 881 F.2d 1273 (5th Cir. 1989) (en bane), aff'd sub nom. Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822
(1990).
195. The majority opinion by Judge Higginbotham occasioned a dissent by Judge King, joined
by four other judges of the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 1295 (King, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 1281.
197. Id. Judge Higginbotham also stated that "[i]t remains possible that an application of
Teague to a conjectural rule may be appropriate in cases where the Teague issues do not turn, as they
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ing relief under an after-decided rule, courts treat the requirement that retroac-
tivity be given threshold consideration as one of priority; they simply decide the
retroactivity of petitioner's claims-with whatever weighing of the merits is
practically necessary-before proceeding to any other issue. Indeed, the fact
that the issue of threshold consideration was passed over entirely by the
Supreme Court in its affirmance of Sawyer may well signal a recognition that the
extreme position of Teague was unworkable from the start.2°° Certainly, no
court has expended much effort sorting out novelty from the constitutional
merits.
Similarly, courts have elevated practicality over doctrine when dealing with
the situation in which the petitioner is arguing for a genuinely novel rule. In one
of the few cases to present a facially novel issue-whether the exclusion of peo-
ple older than seventy from a jury venire is constitutionally impermissible-the
district court painstakingly considered the merits of the claim.20 1 Not only did
the court's opinion discuss the relevant precedents at some length, but it also
referred to an evidentiary hearing which it had held on the question.202 Only
after concluding that there was no constitutional violation did the court consider
whether adoption of the petitioner's contention would create a new rule under
Teague.
20 3
In Byrd v. Delo,2° 4 however, a case presenting a more outlandish novel is-
sue, the habeas court flatly refused to consider the merits of the petitioner's
claim. In Delo, the petitioner attempted to characterize as constitutionally im-
permissible a trial court's ruling that the prosecution was entitled to offer evi-
dence of petitioner's bad character should petitioner attempt to offer evidence of
his good character. 20 5 Delo contended that the ruling constructively denied him
200. Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990).
201. United States ex rel. Silagy v. Peters, 713 F. Supp. 1246, 1250-51 (C.D. Ill. 1989), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part sub nom. Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986 (7th Cir. 1990).
202. Id. at 1249-50.
203. The court concluded that a rule which held that the exclusion of persons older than seventy
from a jury venire was unconstitutional would be more than an extension of existing precedent and
would amount to a new rule which fell into neither of the Teague exceptions. Id. at 1251; cf Harris
v. Vasquez, 913 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1990). In Harris, a panel of the Ninth Circuit virtually inverted
the order of consideration envisioned by the Supreme Court in Teague. Harris argued that he was
entitled to competent psychiatric assistance at trial under the rule of Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68
(1985), a case decided a number of years after his capital murder conviction became final. The
Harris majority first found that the petitioner's claims were barred by both the rules against succes-
sive petitions and against prejudicial delay to the state caused by the petitioner. The court next held
that it would consider Harris's claims in the interest of justice. It then proceded to dispose of
Harris's claims regarding ineffective and inadequate psychiatric assistance on the merits, largely on
the grounds that Harris had chosen to rely on an alibi defense rather than a psychiatric defense at
trial and because, in any event, the state had provided him with psychiatric assistance of his own
choosing. Finally, having thoroughly explored the merits of Harris's claim, the court proceded to
find that the position Harris advocated would be a new rule within the meaning of Teague and that
the rule fell within neither of the Teague exceptions. As if to underscore this inversion, Judge Noo-
nan, concurring in part and dissenting in part, first argued that the rule advocated by Harris fell
squarely within the ambit ofAke, and then contended that Ake itself was a new rule, concluding that
Ake fell within the second Teague exception and was therefore retroactive. See infra notes 289-99
and accompanying text.
204. 733 F. Supp. 1334 (E.D. Mo.), aff'd, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 18140 (8th Cir.), reh'g
granted, stay granted, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 19150 (8th Cir. 1990).
205. Id. at 1338.
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the right to offer mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of his capital
trial.20 6 Without considering the merits of petitioner's claim, the district court
simply noted that it "would mark such a departure from existing law that it
would certainly create a 'new rule' within the meaning of Teague v. Lane.1
20 7
In this case, the court obviously felt no need to weigh the merits of petitioner's
claim. Instead, Teague effectively acted as a screening device, excusing the court
from further consideration of frivolous claims.
3. When Is a Rule of Law "New?"
In Teague, Justice O'Connor defined a "new rule" as one that "breaks new
ground," "imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government,"
or is "not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction
became final." 20 8 In Butler v. McKellar,20 9 Justice Rehnquist explained that a
case is not dictated by existing precedent if its outcome was "susceptible to de-
bate among reasonable minds."12 10 It may be argued that these definitions are
unusually oblique and reflect a rather bewildering view of stare decisis. 211 In
addition, it could be suggested that they do not appear to be mutually consis-
tent.2 12 At the very least, they give little direction to lower courts regarding
exactly what constitutes a "new rule." As Judge King stated in her dissent in
Sawyer v. Butler:
The [Teague] plurality recognized that constitutional rules will fall
along a "spectrum"-from those that fit neatly within the rubric of
settled law to those that constitute a clear break from prior prece-
dent-but provided little additional guidance for determining at which
point a rule is not "dictated" by precedent and, therefore, "new" for
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1070.
209. 110 S. CL 1212 (1990).
210. Id. at 1214.
211. See, eg., id. at 1222 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority view "betrays a
vision of adjudication fundamentally at odds with any this Court has previously recognized").
212. In Teague, Justice O'Connor cited Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987), and Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), as examples of new rules. 109 S. Ct. at 1070. These would sup-
port a relatively narrow definition of "new rule" because Ford was one of those rare cases in which
the Supreme Court actually overruled an earlier decision, Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950).
Furthermore, Rock was arguably a genuine procedural innovation because it both precluded the
courts from adopting a blanket rule excluding all forms of hypnotically refreshed testimony and
addressed for the first time the states' reaction to new techniques in hypnosis. Justice O'Connor's
opinion in Penry appeared to support this narrow view of a "new rule." There she held that Penry
did not announce a new rule as much as the jury instructions at issue failed to "'ulfill the assurance"
of earlier case law. Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2945 (1989). In so deciding, however, Justice
O'Connor appeared to overrule the effect of Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). Jurek had upheld
the statute in question, as well as a great deal of lower federal and state court jurisprudence which-
in reliance on Jurek-had approved the state court practices struck down in Penry.
On the other hand, the dissenters argued that the Penry result was not dictated by prior case
law. 109 S. Ct. at 2969 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In so doing, they seemed to espouse a narrower view
of what constituted a "new rule." The Butler view-if reasonable minds might disagree about the
outcome of a case, it defines a "new rule"-is the fruition of this narrower definition. Butler, 110 S.
Ct. at 1214.
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retroactivity purposes. 2 13
Before the decision in Butler, this disarray had found its way into the lower
court opinions. Indeed, it might be said that one judge's new rule was another's
extension of existing precedent. Take, for example, the experience of two courts
faced with the issue of whether to apply Cruz v. New York 214 retroactively. 2 15
The background of Cruz can be stated briefly. In Bruton v. United States, 2 16 the
Supreme Court held that when the confession of one codefendant contained ref-
erences to a second codefendant, and the confessor refused to testify at trial, the
use of the confession in a joint trial violated the second codefendant's sixth
amendment right of confrontation. Bruton does not bar joinder of accomplices;
it does, however, require deletion of the confessor's prejudicial references to the
codefendant. Despite this rule, courts generally permitted the introduction of an
unredacted confession against the confessor when both defendants gave inter-
locking confessions. 2 17 Cruz held that the Bruton restriction applied even if
there were interlocking confessions.
2 18
In considering whether Teague barred application of Cruz as a "new rule,"
one district court noted that the Supreme Court itself had held that Cruz did
"'no more than reaffirm [Bruton's] central proposition'" and was "'indistin-
guishable from Bruton with respect to those factors that the Court has deemed
relevant in this area.' ",219 The district court, therefore, concluded that Cruz was
not a new rule within the meaning of Teague.220 In contrast, when faced with
the same dilemma, Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit remarked that
"Bruton was a novelty and Cruz a close case even given Bruton. The standard
response to novel decisions that receive unanticipated extensions is not a change
in the harmless error rule but prospective operation. '22 1 Although he eventually
avoided resolving the Teague issue, Judge Easterbrook clearly would have found
Cruz to be a new rule.
222
Other decisions display similar disarray. In discussing the novelty of Mich-
213. Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d 1273, 1297 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (King, J., dissenting), aff'd
sub noma. Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990).
214. 481 U.S. 186 (1987).
215. Hanrahan v. Greer, 896 F.2d 241 (7th Cir. 1990); Reddy v. Coombe, 730 F. Supp. 556
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on different grounds, 916 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1990).
216. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
217. See Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1969).
218. Cruz, 481 U.S. at 193-94.
219. Reddy v. Coombe, 730 F. Supp. at 566 (quoting Cruz, 481 U.S. at 193). Although Judge
Stanton's opinion in Reddy found that Cruz was not a "new rule" and could be applied retroactively
to the case before him, he also offered an alternative ground for decision, explaining that even if Cruz
were a new rule, it applied the confrontation clause in such a way as to implicate the "basis of a fair
hearing and trial," thus implicating the second Teague exception. See id.
220. Id.
221. Hanrahan v. Greer, 896 F.2d 241, 245 (7th Cir. 1990) (dictum).
222. Id. The Hanrahan panel ultimately decided that it need not reach the issue of retroactivity
because the prosecution had waived the defense of nonretroactivity. Id. ("Prosecutors had been
pumping for Justice Harlan's position for years. Not phrasing an objection to retroactivity in the
precise terms the Court adopted in Teague is one thing; not phrasing any objection to retroactivity is
another."); cf. Collins v. Youngblood, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 2718 (1990) (stating that Teague is not juris-




igan v. Jackson,22 3 a panel of the Eleventh Circuit stated in Collins v. Zant that
the "bright-line rule articulated in Edwards v. Arizona... which prohibits po-
lice-initiated interrogations after a defendant has asserted his fif-th amendment
right to counsel, also applies when the defendant has asserted his sixth amend-
ment right to counsel 'at an arraignment or similar proceeding.' "224 This state-
ment seems to imply that Jackson merely applied the already settled Edwards
rule to different facts. In an extended discussion of retroactivity, however, the
court went on to hold that Jackson announced a new rule because it both im-
posed a new obligation on police not to initiate an interrogation after the defend-
ant had invoked his sixth amendment right to counsel and established a new
bright-line rule regarding the exclusion of police-initiated statements.
225
In Newlon v. Armontrout,226 however, the petitioner contended that a Mis-
souri instruction in the penalty phase of capital cases was unconstitutional be-
cause it provided a statutory aggravating circumstance if the "'offense was
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, or
depravity of mind.' "227 Newlon claimed that this instruction did not channel
the sentencer's discretion by "'clear and objective standards'" as required by
existing law. 228 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals simply set forth the
Teague criteria, described the facts of the case and the existing case law, and
then announced that the "rule in question is not a 'new rule' under Teague and
Penry because it is dictated by case law existing at the time Newlon's conviction
became final." 22 9 However, striking down an instruction regularly used in death
penalty cases certainly could be said to impose a new obligation on the state
government. At the very least, it is difficult to reconcile the Eight Circuit's rea-
soning in Newlon v. Armontrout with the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in Collins
v. Zant.
Butler may have narrowed the definition of "new rule" enough to prevent
the Newlon court from reaching the same result if it were to decide the case
today. Arguably, the virtue of the Butler decision is that it provides substantial
guidance to the lower courts by broadening the definition of novelty so that
virtually every rule becomes "new."'230 Even before Butler, however, most
courts found few rules fell outside the Teague definition of novelty.23 1 Rarely
223. 475 U.S. 625 (1986) (holding police may not initiate an interrogation after defendant in-
vokes his sixth amendment right to counsel at an arraignment or similar proceeding).
224. Collins v. Zant, 892 F.2d 1502, 1510 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636).
225. Id. at 1511-12. To add to the confusion, the court recognized that this finding of novelty-
and consequent nonretroactivity--conflicted with a pre-Teague decision by an Eleventh Circuit
panel. Id. at 1511 n. 11 (citing Fleming v. Kemp, 837 F.2d 940, 947 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied
sub nom. Fleming v. Zant, 109 S. Ct. 1764 (1989)).
226. 885 F.2d 1328 (8th Cir. 1989), cert denied sub nor. Delo v. Newlon, 110 S. Ct. 3301 (1990).
227. Id. at 1331 (quoting Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 565.012.2(7) (1978)).
228. Id. at 1333 (citing Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (plurality opinion) (quot-
ing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976))).
229. Id.
230. while Butler is an extremely recent decision, it is possible that courts have been even less
adventuresome in the post-Butler regime than they were earlier. See, eg., United States v. Muller,
733 F. Supp. 1392 (D. Haw. 1990) (discussing novelty of the rule in Gomez v. United States, 109 S.
Ct. 2237 (1989)).
231. See, ag., discussion of cases applying Gomez v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2237 (1989), infra
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did courts stretch as the Newlon court did in order to give a petitioner the benefit
of an "after decided" rule. At the very least, Butler and Sawyer reinforce this
predisposition; courts will be inclined to think twice before finding a rule not to
be novel. This broad view of novelty clearly shifts the focus of retroactivity
analysis to the Teague exceptions. Following Butler and Sawyer, a court wishing
to inject some flexibility into its consideration of retroactivity will be forced to
rely on the Teague exceptions, an increasingly difficult proposition, or engineer
some completely novel solution of its own.
4. The First Teague Exception: Does the New Rule Exempt a Category of
Primary Conduct from Punishment?
The Teague plurality identified two exceptional situations, initially pro-
posed by Justice Harlan, in which a new rule of constitutional law ought to
apply retroactively to cases that were final at the time that the rule was an-
nounced. The first exception was for a rule which "places 'certain kinds of pri-
mary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe.' ",232 In Penry, a majority of the Court concluded that
this exception should cover "not only rules forbidding criminal punishment of
certain primary conduct but also rules prohibiting a certain category of punish-
ment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense."'23 3
As might be expected, so far very few cases presented to the lower courts
have fit within the primary conduct exception, even as broadened in Penry. In
the most likely candidate, Callanan v. United States,234 a case collaterally at-
tacking a mail fraud conviction, the court explicitly based its decision on other
grounds,23 5 although the court's reasoning easily could place petitioners' claim
under the first Teague exception. The petitioners, a father-judge and son-attor-
ney pair, were convicted of mail fraud as a result of a scheme to fix cases heard
by the father.23 6 After their convictions were final, the Supreme Court decided
McNally v. United States,23 7 which repudiated the intangible rights theory on
which their convictions were based.
Both father and son then filed petitions for habeas corpus relief. Relying on
the Supreme Court decision in Allen v. Hardy,238 the district court held that
McNally was not retroactive.239 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit modified the dis-
notes 253-75 and accompanying text; cases applying Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985),
supra notes 119-53 and accompanying text.
232. Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. at 1073 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey v. United States,
401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
233. Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2953 (1989).
234. 881 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1816 (1990).
235. Id. at 232 n.1 (Teague "addresses only the retroactivity of 'new constitutional rules of crim-
inal procedure' and thus does not control our decision here.").
236. Id. at 230.
237. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
238. 478 U.S. 255 (1986) (per curiam) (finding that Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986),
prohibiting prosecution's use of peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner, could
not be applied retroactively).
239. United States v. Callanan, 671 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Mich. 1987), modified, 881 F.2d 229 (6th
Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1816 (1990).
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trict court opinion which had held that Allen was limited to new rules of crimi-
nal procedure rather than new interpretations of substantive criminal law.24°
The Sixth Circuit panel, instead, required retroactive application of any change
in the substantive criminal law-such as McNally-which results in the defend-
ant being punished" 'for an act that the law does not [now] make criminal.' "241
The court also explicitly distinguished the case before it from the situation in
Teague, stating that Teague, like Allen, addressed only "'new constitutional
rules of criminal procedure"' and did not control in a case involving the inter-
pretation of substantive criminal law.2
42
Nevertheless, in the course of its opinion, the appeals court had established
most of the predicates for Teague analysis. The court pointed out that McNally
established a new rule which was a clear break with existing precedent and that
the decision exempted certain categories of conduct from punishment.243 The
court apparently balked at the use of Teague because it viewed the case before it
as one of statutory interpretation rather than one of constitutional import, as
seemingly required by the second Teague exception. While this reasoning could
augur a more limited role for Teague in cases challenging convictions under
federal laws than in petitions for habeas review of state convictions, no other
court appears to have read Teague in this limited way. 244 What is clear is that
courts rarely have been called on to interpret the first Teague exception.
5. The Second Teague Exception: Fundamental Fairness or
Accuracy of Determination
The second Teague exception provides for the retroactive application of wa-
tershed rules which involve "the observance of 'those procedures that... are
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' .... 245 The Teague plurality empha-
sized fact-finding reliability-"procedures without which the likelihood of an
accurate conviction is seriously diminished" 2 "1--while the concurring justices
emphasized fundamental procedural fairness-" 'those "fundamental principles
of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institu-
tions."' '"247 The interests of fairness and accuracy obviously are not mutually
exclusive, and the examples of watershed rules given by the Teague plurality
240. Callanan, 881 F.2d at 231.
241. Id. (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974)).
242. Id. at 232 n.1 (quoting Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1075).
243. Id. at 231.
244. See discussion of cases applying Gomez-v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2237 (1989), infra notes
253-75 and accompanying text.
245. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1073 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S.
667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (Cardozo, J.))).
246. Id. at 1076-77. Moreover, the Teague plurality cautioned that procedures falling within the
second exception would be "so central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt,[that] we
believe it unlikely that many such components of basic due process have yet to emerge." Id. at 1077.
Thus, at least according to the plurality, the second exception is supposed to be a narrow one as well.
247. Id. at 1080 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937) (quoting Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926))).
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would qualify under both analyses. 248 In Butler v. McKellar,24 9 however, the
majority, led by Justice Rehnquist, put its weight behind the more restrictive
view of the second exception, linking it to rules that enhance the accuracy of
fact-finding rather than those that are merely conducive to procedural fair-
ness.250 Moreover, in Sawyer v. Smith,251 Justice Kennedy effectively suggested
that the exception was narrower still, being reserved for rules which both en-
hanced the reliability of fact-finding and revised the legal community's under-
standing of "bedrock procedural elements."
252
Initially, it appeared that the second exception would permit courts leeway
to mitigate the more draconian tendencies of Teague. Although this may be a
fair assessment of the potential inherent in the second exception, the lower fed-
eral courts have not shown any inclination toward making full use of those pos-
sibilities. Indeed, even before Sawyer, the drift of the lower courts was toward
the Butler reading of the "watershed rule" exception and, thus, toward a uni-
form finding of nonretroactivity, no matter what the procedural rule in question.
This development is well illustrated by the post-Teague line of cases in
which the courts considered the retroactivity of Gomez v. United States.25 3 In
Gomez, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Magistrates Act254 did not
empower federal magistrates to conduct jury selection in felony trials. 255 Ini-
tially, it appeared that the lower courts would split regarding the retroactive
application of Gomez to habeas corpus petitioners.2 56 The tide then turned,
248. Id. at 1077 (citing Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 544 (1982) (Stevens, J. dissenting), which
discussed overturning convictions which were dominated or obtained by mob violence, the govern-
ment's use of perjured testimony, or a brutally coerced confession); cf. Safle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct.
1257, 1264 (1990) ("Whatever one may think of the importance of respondent's proposed rule, it has
none of the primacy and centrality of the rule adopted in Gideon or other rules which may be
thought to be within the exception.").
249. 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990).
250. Id. at 1218. But see 1 J. LIEBMAN, supra note 5, § 22A.1, at 118 (Supp. 1989). Professor
Liebman states:
Emphases aside, however, there is much about the two competing formulations that is
similar. In the first place, both formulations are rule-, not petitioner-, specific. Both ver-
sions, that is, apply to rules that in the run of cases affect reliability or fairness, irrespective
of whether the rule would have that effect in the particular case before the Court. In this
respect, the second exception is distinguishable from recent habeas corpus proposals to
limit the "miscarriage of justice" exception to other procedural bars to particular cases in
which individual petitioners can demonstrate a "colorable claim of factual innocence."
Id.; cf. Hoffman, supra note 5, at 213-15 (advocating restoration of the exception for claims based on
new procedures that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty and the addition of a new excep-
tion for claims capable of repetition yet evading review).
251. 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990).
252. Id at 2831 (quoting Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1076 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S.
667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))).
253. 109 S. Ct. 2237 (1989). Prior to the Court's decision in Sawyer, the cases assessing the
retroactivity of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), also served as an excellent example of
the problems raised by the application of the second exception.
254. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1988). The provision at issue granted federal magistrates the power
to perform "such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States." Id. The question before the Court was whether this grant of authority included jury
selection. The Court held that it did not and, further, that Gomez error was not subject to harmless
error analysis. Gomez, 109 S. Ct. at 2247-48.
255. Gomez, 109 S. Ct. at 2246-47.
256. Compare United States v. France, 886 F.2d 223, 227 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating in dictum that
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however, and the holdings became unanimous in favor of nonretroactivity.25 7
The lower courts uniformly held that Gomez announced a new rule of criminal
procedure.258 The contested issue was whether the Gomez rule was a watershed
rule within the meaning of the second Teague exception.2 59
At first, it appeared that Gomez might be given retroactive application
under the second Teague exception. Shortly after Gomez was decided, the Ninth
Circuit held the Gomez rule to be retroactive on direct appeal under a straight-
forward application of Griffith v. Kentucky.26° Although the Ninth Circuit did
not decide whether Gomez ought to be given retroactive effect in collateral re-
view, the court dropped copious hints as to how it would decide that question
when it arose. Apparently with its eye on the second Teague exception, the
court characterized Gomez as a decision "grounded in notions of trial 'accu-
racy'" and remarked that "the rule announced in Gomez is one that touches on
one of the most 'basic rights' of the accused, the right to a fair and accurate
trial." 26 1
In United States v. Baron,262 a district court in the Ninth Circuit picked up
the hint and held that the Gomez rule was new but fell within the second Teague
exception for the reasons stated in France.263 That was on October 2, 1989. By
Gomez rule would be applicable), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1921 (1990) with United States v. Rubio,
722 F. Supp. 77, 85 (D. Del. 1989) (holding Gomez should not be applied retroactively on collateral
review), aff'd, 908 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1990).
257. Indeed, two courts within the same district reached opposite conclusions on the issue within
four months of one another, apparently with the same federal public defender appearing in both
cases. United States v. Makaweo, 730 F. Supp. 1016, 1017-18 (D. Haw. 1990); United States v.
Baron, 721 F. Supp. 259, 262 (D. Haw. 1989).
258. In fact, all but one of the decisions finding Gomez to be novel took place prior to the Butler
decision narrowing the definition of a new rule. This unanimity is hardly surprising in light of the
fact that, before Gomez, fifty-one federal districts permitted jury selection by magistrates in felony
trials. Rubio, 722 F. Supp. at 86 (citing Brief for the United States, Gomez v. United States, 109 S.
Ct. 2237 (1989)). There was a split among the circuits on the propriety of the practice, and prior to
Gomez, the Supreme Court had not addressed the issue. In fact, as one district court remarked, "the
trend prior to Gomez was toward expanding-not limiting-the authority of the magistrates." Ru-
bio, 722 F. Supp. at 85.
259. The first exception was clearly inapposite because Gomez did not deal with primary
conduct.
260. United States v. France, 886 F.2d 223, 227 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479
U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (holding that all rules of constitutional criminal procedure apply retroactively
to cases not yet final), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 285 (1990)); see supra notes 161-64 and accompanying
text. The primary issue was whether France had waived her right to a reversal under Gomez by
failing to make a contemporaneous objection to the magistrate presiding at the voir dire. The Ninth
Circuit held that there was no waiver because under the "'solid wall of circuit authority'" such an
objection would have been futile. France, 886 F.2d at 228. The Supreme Court has granted certio-
rari to review this issue. See United States v. France, 110 S. Ct. 1921 (1990).
261. France, 886 F.2d at 226 n.2, 228 (leaving open the Teague question and discussing the
significance of Gomez). Faced with a similar question in United States v. Lopez-Pena, 890 F.2d 490
(1st Cir. 1989) (withdrawn from publication pending disposition of a petition for rehearing en banc),
the First Circuit also found that Griffith required the application of Gomez to cases then pending on
direct appeal. The court also pointed out that such a conclusion did not in any way intimate that
Gomez would apply retroactively to cases in which the conviction was final, dropping the strong hint
that it would find Gomez nonretroactive were the situation presented. Id. at 226 n.3 (citing United
States v. Rubio, 722 F. Supp. 77, 84 (D. Del. 1989), aff'd, 908 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1990), for the
proposition that Gomez is not retroactive on collateral review.).
262. 721 F. Supp. 259 (D. Haw. 1989).
263. Id. at 261. The Baron court therefore applied Gomez retroactively to vacate the petitioner's
conviction. Id. at 263.
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November, the winds blew from a different direction in the same courthouse. 26 4
Thereafter, no court in the Ninth Circuit2 6 -- indeed, it appears no court any-
where-has found Gomez to be retroactive. The difference appears to have been
the decision in United States v. Rubio,266 written by Judge Schwartz of the fed-
eral district court in Delaware, and the ensuing Supreme Court decisions in But-
ler and Saffle.
The court in Rubio found that Gomez was a new rule because it entailed a
break with the trend of the law and with settled federal court practice.
267
Brushing aside the first Teague exception, Judge Schwartz held that Gomez
could not fall within the second exception because it could not be meaningfully
distinguished from the situation presented in Teague itself.268 As Judge
Schwartz noted, both cases involve challenges to the propriety of the jury
empanelment:
Whereas the petitioner in Teague raised a sixth amendment chal-
lenge to the propriety of the jury empanelment,... [this petitioner's]
claim is based upon the Court's interpretation of a statute. Empanel-
ment before a federal magistrate is no more likely to impact upon the
accuracy of conviction than the use of peremptory challenges to strike
jurors of the same race as the defendant. Surely if the constitutional
claim raised by the petitioner in Teague did not implicate "fundamen-
tal fairness" as defined by the plurality, the statutory claim before me
also fails to come within the second exception.
269
264. United States v. Bezold, No. 82-1027, slip op. (D. Haw. 1989) (finding Gomez nonretroac-
tive on collateral review).
265. In February 1990, the district court in United States v. Makaweo, 730 F. Supp. 1016 (D.
Haw. 1990), held that Gomez did not present the kind of bedrock procedural rule that would be
entitled to full collateral application. Id. at 1017. Rather, the court pointed out that if Teague held
the application of the fair cross-section requirement to the petit jury not to be within the second
exception then, a fortiori, Gomez, a mere rule of statutory construction regarding jury selection
could not be the type of watershed rule contemplated by the second exception. Id. There is a
suggestion that the Makaweo court took umbrage at the France court's suggestion that a magistrate-
selected jury might reach less accurate conclusions than a jury selected by an Article III judge. Id.
at 1017-18 ("[N]owhere in France is it stated or even intimated that magistrate selection of a felony
jury 'undermined' the fundamental fairness of a criminal trial or 'seriously diminished the likelihood'
of obtaining an accurate conviction.").
Shortly afterward, another district court in Hawaii held Gomez to be nonretroactive on a differ-
ent rationale. In United States v. Muller, 733 F. Supp. 1392 (D. Haw. 1990), the court cited both
Butler and Saffle-which had been decided in the interim-and focused on the rules available to the
district court at the time that the petitioner's case was tried. Id. at 1395. While agreeing that the
selection of a jury occupies a "critical stage of a criminal proceeding," the court held that "at the
time of the petitioner's trial, the empaneling of a jury by a magistrate constituted 'criminal proceed-
ings in accordance with the Constitution as interpreted at the time of the proceeding.'" Id. (quoting
Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257, 1260 (1990)). Furthermore, the court concluded that "there is no
indication that such a procedure 'seriously diminished the likelihood of obtaining an accurate deter-
mination.'" Id. (quoting Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1218 (1990)).
266. 722 F. Supp. 77 (D. Del. 1989), aff'd, 908 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1990). The Gomez claim was
procedurally barred because petitioner Rubio had failed to raise it either at trial or on direct appeal
and was unable to make a proper showing of cause and prejudice for the omission. Id. at 82-83.
Thus, the discussion of retroactivity in the opinion arose purely in dicta. Id. at 83-84.
267. Id. at 84-85.
268. Id. at 85.
269. Id.
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Judge Schwartz's reasoning was extremely influental, 270 with at least one
district court explicitly describing the analogy to the Teague jury selection issue
as "persuasive." 27 1 A few months later, a second court in the same district also
refused to apply Gomez retroactively, relying heavily on the Rubio decision.
27 2
That court, however, writing after Butler and Saffle, stressed that when a neutral
and detached magistrate presides over a jury voir dire "it certainly is not more
likely that an innocent man will be found guilty. '27 3 In fact, the court went on
to point out that the presence of adversaries in the voir dire was sufficient to
protect "fundamental fairness," "' ordered liberty,'" and "'accuracy of convic-
tion.' "274 The implication, if any, to be drawn from this line of cases is that,
even before Sawyer, the courts anticipated the restrictive direction of the
Supreme Court's decisions and attempted to demonstrate that a new procedural
rule was nonretroactive under as many standards as were then available to
them.27s
III. THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA: PITFALLS FOR PETITIONERS
UNDER TEAGUE
As can be inferred from the preceding discussion, existing habeas proce-
dural rules join with Teague retroactivity analysis to create serious problems for
petitioners seeking to present claims based on decisions handed down after their
convictions became final, difficulties best described by the term "whipsaw." The
first problem is created by the rule of Wainwright v. Sykes,27 6 which held that a
petitioner's procedural default before the state courts may be excused-and a
defaulted claim heard on federal habeas review--only on a showing of "cause
and prejudice. ' 27 7 As the courts have fleshed out the meaning of this phrase,
"cause" has come to turn on "whether the prisoner can show that some objec-
tive factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the
270. See, e.g., United States v. Makaweo, 730 F. Supp. 1016, 1018 n.3 (D. Haw. 1990) (although
the Makaweo opinion merely cites Rubio in a footnote, it adopts much of Judge Schwartz's argument
without clear attribution); Hrubec v. United States, 734 F. Supp. 60, 65-66 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
271. Gilberti v. United States, 731 F. Supp. 576, 579 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd 917 F.2d 92 (2d Cir.
1990).
272. Hrubec, 734 F. Supp. at 66. In Hrubec, Judge Bartels also wrestled with the question of
whether Teague could be applied to questions of statutory interpretation arising in collateral review
of federal convictions. He concluded that the finality concerns of Teague were overriding and that it
should be applied. Id. at 64-65.
273. Id. at 66.
274. Id.
275. Cf. United States v. Muller, 733 F. Supp. 1392, 1395 (D. Haw. 1990) (holding that the
Gomez rule should not be applied retroactively because magistrate selection of jury was proper at
time of trial and did not seriously impede an accurate verdict). Muller cited Butler and Saffle to
suggest that:
at the time of the petitioner's trial, the empaneling of a jury by a magistrate constituted
"criminal proceedings in accordance with the Constitution as interpreted at the time of the
proceeding." Furthermore there is no indication that such a procedure "seriously dimin-
ish[ed] the likelihood of obtaining an accurate determination."
Id. (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. CL 1257, 1260 (1990) and Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212,
1218 (1990)).
276. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
277. Id. at 86-87.
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State's procedural rule." 278 One way a petitioner can establish an objective ex-
ternal cause for his default is to show that his "constitutional claim is so novel
that its legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel" 279 at the time the claim
should have been made.
Thus, if a petitioner is able to show that his claim is based on a "new" rule
of law, the habeas court will excuse his state procedural default, assuming peti-
tioner can show actual prejudice. But, having shown that the rule under which
he seeks relief was not available to him at the time he should have raised it in the
state courts, the petitioner may well have won the battle under Wainwright only
to lose the war to Teague. Under most circumstances, the petitioner will have
just shown that the very rule under which he seeks relief is not retroactive unless
he can fit it into one of the two Teague exceptions.
280
Such considerations already appear in the literature and in the decided
cases, although in more convoluted form than might have been anticipated.
281
278. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).
279. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984). The same point was made in Murray v. Carrier, 477
U.S. 478 (1986), in which the Court also suggested two other external impediments: (1) when state
officials interfere with counsel's ability to avoid default or (2) when default is the result of attorney
error rising to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. Carrier also
held that the cause standard might be dispensed with altogether in the extraordinary situation in
which the constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of an innocent person. Id.
at 496.
280. For example, in Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 888 F.2d 1286 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 3256 (1990), the Tenth Circuit wrestled with that very problem in a case involving Caldwell
error. For a discussion of Hopkinson in connection with Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990), see
supra notes 128-33, 154-55 and accompanying text. Petitioner Hopkinson claimed that the prosecu-
tor's comment during his capital sentencing violated the Supreme Court's decision in Caldwell v.
Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), a case decided two years after Hopkinson's death sentence became
final. Hopkinson, 888 F.2d at 1287-88. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals first decided, without
explanation, that the state's failure to raise the issue of retroactivity did not waive the defense. Id. at
1288. But see Collins v. Youngblood, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 2718 (1990) (brief statement that Teague is
not jurisdictional in the sense that it must be raised sua sponte and that a Teague issue may be
waived by the state). It then considered whether Caldwell presented a "new rule" under Teague and
concluded that it did. This ruling was based largely on existing case law holding that failure to raise
a Caldwell error fell within the category of "cause" excusing a procedural default because it was
failure to raise a constitutional issue reasonably unknown to counsel. Hopkison, 888 F.2d at 1289-
90 (citing Dutton v. Brown, 812 F.2d 593, 596 (10th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied sub nom. Dutton v.
Maynard, 484 U.S. 836 (1987)). In Hopkinson, the Court expressly declined to hold that analysis of
a new rule for "cause" and for nonretroactivity were different. Id. at 1290. Instead, the court found
that, "[c]omparing the two definitions, there is far more ground for congruence than for distinction,"
and noted that "a holding that a claim is so novel that there is no reasonably available basis for it,
thus establishing cause, must also mean that the claim was too novel to be dictated by past prece-
dent." Id.
281. Commentators such as Leibman have commented on the interaction between the proce-
dural default standard and Teague. See 1 J. LIEBMAN, supra note 5, § 22A.1, at 111-13 (Supp.
1989).
Other than Hopkinson, 888 F.2d 1286, and Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d 1273 (5th Cir. 1989),
aff'd sub nom. Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990), however, the procedural default/Teague
retroactivity issue thus far has arisen in only a handful of decisions. For example, in United States v.
Rubio, 722 F. Supp. 77 (D. Del. 1989), aff'd, 908 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1990), Rubio's default involved
the failure to make a Gomez objection at the voir dire. In his habeas petition, Rubio did not even
attempt to show cause and the court found that he had not made a colorable showing of actual
prejudice. Id. at 82-83. Cf. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982) (importing the
cause and actual prejudice standard into the § 2255 context when there is a failure to make a con-
temporaneous objection).
Davis v. Armontrout, No. 88-1194-CV-W-1-P (W.D. Mo. Aug. 16, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed
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A particularly perverse version of the "whipsaw" appears in a recent Fifth Cir-
cuit case in which the petitioner claimed that the jury instructions in the capital
sentencing phase of his trial had failed to give the jury proper guidance regard-
ing the use of mitigating evidence. 282 The Fifth Circuit candidly admitted that
the petitioner's argument had been accepted by the Supreme Court in Penry.28
However, the court found the claim to be procedurally barred because the peti-
tioner had failed to make a proper objection or request for a mitigating instruc-
tion at trial.284 Petitioner countered that there was good cause for his default
because, at the time of trial, the constitutionality of the Texas capital sentencing
scheme was settled.28 5 The court of appeals disposed of this argument by re-
minding the petitioner that the Supreme Court had held that Penry did not an-
nounce a new rule regarding mitigating evidence; accordingly, there was no
good cause for failure to raise the objection at trial.
286
Petitioners, possibly even more frequently, find themselves squeezed be-
tween the demands of retroactivity and habeas procedure when attempting to
file a second habeas petition after a first has been denied. The rules governing
federal habeas corpus petitions by state prisoners provide that the court may
dismiss a second or successive petition if the petition "fails to allege new or
different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the merits.
'28 7
Once again, the interaction between two definitions of novelty, one for retroac-
tivity and the other for successive petitions, poses a dilemma for the petitioner.
If the issue presented by the petitioner in a second writ is sufficiently novel to
excuse a successive petition, then it will almost certainly be a new rule for pur-
poses of retroactivity analysis.
288
For example, in the course of entertaining an emergency application for a
certificate of probable cause to appeal, Judge Noonan of the Ninth Circuit was
called upon to consider the issues raised by a third habeas petition on behalf of
library, Dist file), presented an even more bizarre dilemma. In that case, the court initially held that
the petitioner's claim regarding jury selection could not be heard under the Batson rule since Batson
was not retroactive under both Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986) and Teague. Davis, LEXIS at
20-21. Therefore, the only rule applicable to petitioner was that of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202
(1965). Davis, LEXIS at 21. Accordingly, petitioner Davis could not claim novelty as a cause of his
failure to object at trial since Townsend had already been decided at the time he was tried. Id. at 22.
Instead, he was thrown back on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. As the court pointed
out, however, the Batson argument in Davis's habeas petition had been unavailable when he was
tried; thus it was not ineffective assistance to have failed to raise the claim, and, moreover, even if
counsel had advanced the Townsend claim, it would have failed. Id.
282. Fierro v. Lynaugh, 879 F.2d 1276, 1280 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Fierro v.




286. .Id. at 1281-82.
287. 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Federal Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 9(b) (1988). Even if new
and different grounds for relief are alleged in a second or successive petition, the judge may dismiss
the petition if the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition was an "abuse of
the writ." Id.
288. For obvious reasons, given the number of successive petitions filed in death penalty cases,
this rule will have a disproportionate impact on death penalty cases. See authorities cited infra note
354.
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Robert Alton Harris.289 Harris claimed that the psychiatric assistance given
him at the penalty phase of his trial was incompetent and thereby violated the
rule of Ake v. Oklahoma,29° a case decided three years after Harris's second
petition was filed. 29 1 Judge Noonan found that Harris had not abused the writ
because Ake was both a fundamental rule and was unavailable at the time of
Harris's previous petitions.292 As Judge Noonan promptly recognized, however,
the novelty of Ake rendered the case nonretroactive unless it fell within a Teague
exception. 293 Suggesting that Ake is based on considerations of fundamental
fairness and that it enhances the accuracy of the jury's conclusions, Judge Noo-
nan then held that a reasonable jurist could conclude that the Ake rule fell
within the second Teague exception and that a colorable argument could be
made that the rule would be applied retroactively, despite its novelty.2 94
Faced with the task of resolving Harris's petition on the merits, howeveri a
panel of the Ninth Circuit held, inter alia, that his claims would be barred by the
rule against abuse of the writ because he had raised similiar issues in his prior
petitions. 295 The majority then went on to consider the merits of Harris's claims
in the interests of justice,296 finding that his contention that he was entitled to
competent psychiatric assistance amounted to a novel extension of Ake297 that
would -not be retroactive because it did not amount to a watershed rule within
the meaning of the second Teague exception.298 Untroubled by the inconsis-
tency involved, the majority of the panel at once held that the issues were avail-
able to Harris at the time he fied his second petition and that they were a novel
extension of a rule that was itself novel when it was decided-some two years
after the filing of Harris's previous petition.
299
289. Harris v. Vasquez, 901 F.2d 724 (9th Cir.),petition to vacate denied, 110 S. Ct. 1799 (1990).
The case appeared before the court of appeals as an emergency application for a certificate of prob-
able cause to appeal from the district court's denial of Harris's petition for habeas corpus combined
with a motion for a stay of execution. Id. at 725. Thus, the matter was before a single judge, in this
case Judge Noonan. Id. at 727. The court had to decide whether Harris had made "a substantial
showing of the denial of a federal right," but was not faced with the actual resolution of the underly-
ing appellate issues. Id. at 725 (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)). The actual
issues were resolved in a subsequent opinion, Harris v. Vasquez, 913 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1990). See
infra notes 295-99 and accompanying text; see also supra note 203.
290. 470 U.S. 68, 80 (1985) ("[W]hen the State has made the defendant's mental condition rele-
vant to his criminal culpability and to the punishment he might suffer, the assistance of a psychiatrist
may well be crucial to the defendant's ability to marshal his defense.").
291. Harris, 901 F.2d at 726.
292. Id. at 726-27.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Harris v. Vasquez, 913 F.2d 606, 618 (9th Cir. 1990).
296. Id.
297. Id. at 622.
298. Id. at 625.
299. Dissenting from the panel's resolution of the Ake issue, Judge Noonan did not speak di-
rectly to the abuse of the writ question. Instead, he repeated his view that Harris's claim fell
squarely within the rule enunciated by Ake and that Ake, while novel under Teague, nevertheless
was a watershed rule of constitutional criminal procedure pursuant to the second Teague exception,
Accordingly, Judge Noonan argued that Harris was entitled to an evidentiary hearing in which he
might substantiate his claims of ineffective psychiatric assistance. Id. at 630 (Noonan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
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The Eleventh Circuit has been a particularly fertile ground for such issues,
with outcomes equally unfavorable to the petitioners. In Collins v. Zant,3° ° the
petitioner presented a second habeas corpus petition to the court, claiming, inter
alia, that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a statement he made
after his request at arraignment for court-appointed counsel. 30 1 Collins had
challenged the statement in his first petition, arguing that its admission violated
Edwards v. Arizona,30 2 which prohibited police-initiated interrogations once the
defendant asserted his fifth amendment rights.30 3 In the second petition, Collins
argued that admission of the statement violated the recently decided Michigan v.
Jackson,3°4 which prohibited police-initiated interrogations after the defendant
asserts his right to counsel at an arraignment or similar proceeding.
The Collins court held, seriatim, that the Jackson claim was not new for
purposes of the rules governing successive habeas corpus petitions on behalf of
state prisoners because it merely presented a different legal predicate for a claim
already raised;30 5 that even if it were a new ground for relief, it would fail be-
cause Jackson presents a "new rule" within the meaning of Teague and therefore
would not apply retroactively; 30 6 and that since the Jackson claim was neither
new nor retroactive, the "interests of justice" did not require the court to hear
it.307 The message of Collins is patent: any way a petitioner argued his case, he
Would lose.
The Eleventh Circuit's most extended discussion of the problem posed by
the interaction of rules governing successive petitions and retroactivity arises in
Moore v. Zant.308 Moore's second petition for federal habeas corpus relief
300. 892 F.2d 1502 (per curiam), reh'g denied, 900 F.2d 267 (lth Cir.) (en bane), cert denied,
59 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Oct 2, 1990).
301. Id. at 1504.
302. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
303. Collins v. Francis, 728 F.2d 1322, 1331-34 (lth Cir.), cert, denied, 4-69 U.S. 963 (1984).
304. 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
305. Collins, 892 F.2d at 1510.
306. Id. at 1510-12. The Collins court admitted that under pre-Teague case law, a different
panel of the Eleventh Circuit had held that Jackson was retroactive in cases on collateral review
involving sentencing errors. Id. at 1511 n.11 (citing Fleming v. Kemp, 837 F.2d 940, 947 (11th Cir.
1988), cert. denied sub nom. Fleming v. Zant, 109 S. Ct. 1764 (1989)). However, Collins held that
Jackson presented a new rule within the meaning of Teague because "it imposed a new obligation on
police (not to initiate an interrogation after a defendant has asserted his right to counsel under the
sixth amendment) and established a bright-line rule excluding police initiated statements (a result
not dictated by then existing precedent)." Id. at 1511-12. Moreover, it failed to fall within either
exception to Teague, because it did not deal with primary, private conduct, nor did it implicate the
concept of ordered liberty or accuracy of result. Id. at 1512 (citing, inter alia, Jackson, 475 U.S. at
638-640 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Jackson involves a 'prophylactic rule' providing 'second layer
of protection' ")).
307. Collins, 892 F.2d at 1510.
308. 885 F.2d 1497 (11th Cir. 1989) (en bane), on remand from the United States Supreme
Court, 109 S. Ct. 1518 (1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 3255 (1990). Moore originated as an appeal
from a district court dismissal of the petitioner's second application for federal habeas corpus as an
abuse of the writ within the meaning of Rule 9(b). Moore v. Kemp, 824 F.2d 847, 849 n.1 (1 lth Cir.
1987) (en banc). The Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, ultimately reversed and remanded in part.
Id. at 857. Subsequently, the state filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court
and, after oral argument, the en banc opinion was vacated and remanded for further consideration in
light of Teague. Zant v. Moore, 109 S. CL 1518 (1989) (per curiam).
The opinion of the Eleventh Circuit on remand reflects a divided court. Judge Cox wrote a
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presented a number of issues which he had failed to raise in his first petition, the
relevant claims being based on Estelle v. Smith 30 and Profitt v. Wainwright.
3 10
The majority of the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, believed that Moore did
not abuse the writ when he failed to raise the Estelle and Profitt claims because
neither he nor his counsel could have reasonably anticipated the underlying de-
cisions.3 11 On remand from the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit was
charged with the task of reconsidering its findings in light of Teague.3 12 The
litigants themselves disagreed widely on the scope of the remand. Both, how-
ever, viewed abuse of the writ and retroactivity as separate inquiries to be con-
ducted at the threshold of a successive petition.
3 13
The Eleventh Circuit agreed, although in a way devastating to petitioner's
claims. The court simply avoided consideration of the retroactivity of Estelle
and Proffitt-evading the purpose of the Supreme Court's remand-by treating
the abuse of the writ issue first. The court of appeals held that the arguments
involved in the Estelle and Profitt claims could reasonably have been anticipated
by counsel; hence, the claims were not "new" within the meaning of the federal
habeas rules, the second petition was an abuse of the writ, and the court need
not consider the merits of the petition.
314
The ramifications of the Eleventh Circuit's position are troubling. If a
court holds that a rule of law is sufficiently novel to serve as the basis for the
filing of a second habeas corpus petition, the rule is virtually certain to fall
within the Teague definition of novelty as well; accordingly, the court will be
precluded from considering the underlying claim. If a court holds that a rule is
not "new" for the purpose of excusing a second petition, the court will dismiss
the petition and refuse to consider the claim. Under these circumstances, the
petitioner's chances of presenting the merits of his petition to a federal court are
slim indeed.
plurality opinion on behalf of himself and three other judges. Moore v. Zant, 885 F.2d at 1499
(plurality opinion). Judges Roney, Hill, and Edmonson all wrote separate concurrences. Id. at 1514
(Roney, C.J., specially concurring); id. at 1518 (Hill, J., concurring); id (Edmondson, J., concur-
ring). Judge Kravitch dissented on behalf of herself and Judges Clark and Anderson. Id. at 1518
(Kravitch, J., dissenting). Judge Johnson dissented on behalf of himself and Judge Hatchett with
Judges Kravitch, Anderson, and Clark joining in part. Id. at 1522 (Johnson, J., dissenting). Judge
Anderson dissented separately. Id. at 1528 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
309. 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (the state may be obliged to warn defendant of his right to counsel
prior to interviews by persons not primarily responsible for law enforcement).
310. 685 F.2d 1227 (1lth Cir. 1982), modified, 706 F.2d 311 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1002 (1983) (right to confront and cross-examine witnesses whose hearsay was presented in
presentence report). Moore presented five claims in all. The other three concerned Gardner v. Flor-
ida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (establishing limited right of defendant to review the presentence report),
the racially discriminatory application of the death penalty, and ineffective assistance of counsel. See
Moore v. Zant, 885 F.2d at 1501. The circuit court originally suggested the hearing of the Gardner
claim might be within the interests of justice. Moore v. Kemp, 824 F.2d at 857. On remand, how-
ever, the court of appeals found that the Gardner claim was procedurally barred because of a deliber-
ate bypass and that the interests ofjustice did not require that it be heard because Moore could make
no colorable claim of factual innocence or of an error affecting a material question in his sentencing.
Id. at 1512-13. The court of appeals then dismissed the remaining claims.
311. Moore v. Kemp, 824 F.2d at 850-54.
312. Zant v. Moore, 109 S. Ct. 1518 (1989) (per curiam).
313. Moore v. Zant, 885 F.2d at 1503-04 & n.8.
314. Id. at 1506-12.
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Recognizing this irony, Judge Johnson dissented in Moore and argued that
the court was bound by its prior finding that Estelle and Proffitt claims could be
heard in a second petition.3 15 In addition, Judge Johnson contended that Prof-
fitt ought to be applied retroactively, because, despite its novelty, Proffitt fit
within the second Teague exception. 31 6 Judge Johnson, however, pointed out
that, in its 1987 opinion, the court had found Estelle to be old for purposes of
retroactivity and new for purposes of denying an ineffective assistance claim
based on counsel's failure to raise the matter.3 17 Judge Johnson suggested that
the Supreme Court remand may have been intended to force the court to impose
some order on these decisions and to take a "hard look" at the relationship
between different notions of "new law."
'318
In a special concurrence, Chief Judge Roney suggested that the majority of
the panel had mistaken the proper order and scope of the inquiry before it.
319
As an alternative, he proposed that, in a successive petition, if the claims not
previously asserted were without merit, the petition could be dismissed without
resort to the abuse of the writ defense.3 20 Because retroactivity is dispositive of
the merits, Judge Roney argued that Teague should be applied first in consider-
ing a successive petition.321 He then concluded that none of the claims ad-
vanced by Moore should be extended retroactively and agreed that the petition
should be dismissed in its entirety.3 22 The impact of order of consideration on
outcome is difficult to assess; however, it would seem that once a court had
committed itself to the view that the case was in some degree meritorious, it
would be less likely to find a successive petition to be an abuse of the writ.
In any event, the relationship between the various definitions of novelty is a
troubling question. Courts apparently believe that novelty for purposes of ex-
cusing procedural default or a successive petition is the same as novelty for pur-
poses of barring retroactive application of a rule unless it falls within a Teague
exception. Under current practice, this raises a cruel dilemma for petitioners.
Under whatever practice develops as a result of the Teague regime, this dynamic
is likely to lead to a further increase in the number, variety, and ingenuity of
claims raised on direct appeal; indeed, it is likely to lead to the placing of even
greater importance on the prisoner's direct appeal. 32
3
315. Id. at 1522-24 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
316. Id. at 1526 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
317. Id. (Johnson, J., dissenting).
318. Id. at 1527 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (suggesting the possibility that "only decisions which
are new law for retroactivity purposes may excuse a successive petition").
319. Id. at 1514 (Roney, CJ., specially concurring).
320. Id. (Roney, C.J., specially concurring) (citations omitted).
321. Id. (Roney, C.J., specially concurring).
322. Id. at 1516 (Roney, CJ., specially concurring). Judge Roney's substantive application of
Teague was somewhat unorthodox in that it eschewed the general three step inquiry and proceeded
directly to the question of whether either Estelle or Proffitt was the type of bedrock rule that ought to
be applied retroactively to all cases. Id. at 1516-17 (Roney, C.J., specially concurring).
323. But see Arkin, Speedy Criminal Appeal. A Right Without a Remedy, 74 MIN. L. REV. 437
(1990) (noting that recent massive increase in number of state criminal appeals often results in pris-
oners' appeals being substantially delayed, with delays up to six years not unheard of).
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'IV. ILIMITING THE REACH OF TEAGUE
The lower federal courts have not shown any great inclination to experi-
ment with the reasoning of Teague in order to permit the more liberal retroac-
tive application of constitutional rules of criminal procedure. This disposition is
simply a reasonable reading of the Supreme Court's direction, particularly after
Butler v. McKellar324 simultaneously expanded the definition of a "new rule"
and tightened the "watershed rule" exception.325 Because courts are under-
standably reluctant to move within the confines of Teague, creative advocacy
and jurisprudence have focused on narrowing the class of cases to which Teague
may be applied.
Following Judge King's suggestion in her dissent in Sawyer v. Butler,
326
some academic commentary has suggested that Teague itself ought not to be
applied retroactively, thus exempting from its reach all cases final at the time it
was decided.327 While there is much to be said for the view that Teague itself
announces a new rule that does not come within the Teague exceptions 328-and
particularly for its irony-no court has seriously taken up the proposal. This
may be due to the fact that courts construe Teague as resolving a question of
statutory authority in habeas corpus rather than one of constitutional law and
therefore not falling within the Teague definition of "new rule."' 32 9 It may also
be due to the fact that the Supreme Court itself has not hesitated to apply
Teague to cases already final at the time Teague was decided.
330
Equally unrewarding was the effort of one advocate to revive a common law
writ, audita querela, in order to evade the reach of Teague.331 While the court
324. 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990).
325. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
326. 881 F.2d 1273, 1305 (5th Cir. 1989) (en bane) (King, J., dissenting), aff'd sub norm Sawyer
v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990). Judge King stated:
It is indeed ironic that the majority invokes Teague, undoubtedly a new rule, to pre-
vent us from applying [a recent Supreme Court decision] .... If any case should be
considered as having established a new rule not retroactively applicable to habeas petition-
ers whose convictions have become final, it is Teague itself. Had the majority decided
Sawyer's case on the basis of the Supreme Court decisions in existence when Sawyer's case
was argued and submitted to this court, the majority opinion would have granted him a
new sentencing hearing. The majority instead reaches out to an opinion rendered by the
Supreme Court 16 months after submission of Sawyer's case and 8 1/2 years after Sawyer's
trial to find a reason to deny him constitutional protection. That to us is a finality of sorts,
a final and irretrievable absurdity.
Id.
327. 1 J. LIEBMAN, supra note 5, § 22A.1, at 122 (Supp. 1989). Liebman notes the irony that
courts not disposed to view the novelty of the Teague opinion itself as a basis for denying its retroac-
tive application to petitioners have found its novelty sufficient ground to excuse respondents from
raising the retroactivity defense in a timely fashion. Id.
328. See supra note 321 (quoting Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d at 1305 (King, J., dissenting)).
329. Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 888 F.2d 1286, 1288 (10th Cir. 1989) (en bane) ("the very scope of
the writ of habeas corpus, and therefore our power to grant relief, is implicated"), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 3256 (1990).
330. Kg., Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990); Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990);
Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
331. United States v. Ayala, 894 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Audita querela is a common-law
writ primarily directed at permitting the defendant "to obtain 'relief against a judgment or execution
because of a defense or discharge arising'" after the judgment was rendered. Historically, audita
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unhappily wrestled with the definition of audita querela, it ultimately concluded
that the writ could be entertained as a basis for vacating a criminal conviction
only if the defendant used it to raise issues not cognizable under the existing
scheme of post-conviction remedies and that a defendant collaterally challenging
his conviction could not style his motion as a petition for a writ of audita querela
in order to avoid procedural requirements in habeas corpus, including those set
forth by Teague.
332
Several justices also have suggested that waiver might serve as a procedural
device for narrowing the scope of Teague; if nonretroactivity were not raised by
the government, the courts should deem it waived. 333 The value of waiver to
petitioners, however, is likely to be limited. On several occasions already, the
Court itself has reached out to decide issues of retroactivity that the parties had
not raised.334 Moreover, as government attorneys adjust to the post-Teague re-
gime, they presumably will raise nonretroactivity as a matter of course in cases
in which it applies, just as they now raise exhaustion of remedies and other
defenses.
Nevertheless, the matter remains somewhat obscure. The question of when
the government may waive a Teague nonretroactivity defense is not clearly set-
tled.335 Initially a number of courts raised the retroactivity question sua sponte,
apparently on the theory that it goes to the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in
habeas.33 6 On the other hand, at least one court held that the government
waived the retroactivity defense by failing to raise it, arguing that disputes about
the retroactive application of constitutional decisions were common prior to
Teague, and therefore the state could not be excused from making the
querela was a remedy mainly for judgment debtors. Id. at 427 (citing I1 C. WRGTrr & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2867, at 235 (1973)). The federal courts' power to issue
common law writs is established by the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1988).
332. Ayala, 894 F.2d at 429 n.8, 430.
333. Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2963 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Nor am I
at all sure that courts should decide the retroactivity issue if it was not raised below."); Zant v.
Moore, 109 S. Ct. 1518, 1519 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (the state "did not raise nonretroac-
tivity as a defense to respondent's claim for federal habeas relief, and that defense should therefore be
deemed waived"); id. (Brennan, J., concurring) (expressing "concern as to whether petitioner should
be permitted to raise the retroactivity issue at this point in the proceedings"). See 1 J. LIEBMAN,
supra note 5, § 22A.1, at 90-91 (Supp. 1989).
334. Eg., Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990); Zant v. Moore, 109 S. Ct. 1518 (1989); Teague
v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989).
335. Liebman in particular raises questions about the retroactivity of rules which restrict the
rights of criminal defendants and habeas petitioners. 1 J. LEBMAN, supra note 5, § 22A.1, at 123
(Supp. 1989). Citing Perry v. Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1384, 1393-94 (8th Cir.) (dicta), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 378 (1989), Liebman suggests that "Teague's policy of treating like litigants alike impels the
conclusion that new rules cutting back on rights not be applied retroactively to post-final convic-
tions," since it would increase the incentive for state courts to ignore existing constitutional law in
the hope that some rule cutting back defendants' rights will be announced "by the increasingly
cohesive conservative majority of the Supreme Court." 1 J. LIEBMAN, supra note 5, § 22A.1, at 123
(Supp. 1989). Liebman also argues that post-Teague case law will follow the general rule for de-
fenses in habeas corpus and will place the burden of raising nonretroactivity and a concomitant
requirement to prove the necessary facts by a preponderance of the evidence on the state. Id. at 121.
336. E.g., Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 888 F.2d 1286, 1288 (10th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert denied,
110 S. Ct. 3256 (1990); cf Moore v. Zant, 885 F.2d 1497, 1524-25 (1 1th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (John-
son, J., dissenting) (assuming that the state did not waive nonretroactivity because "the time to raise
it has not yet arrived"), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 3255 (1990).
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While the Supreme Court has now decided that the government may explic-
itly waive a Teague nonretroactivity claim, it has not given the lower courts
guidance regarding any other circumstances under which such a waiver should
be found.338 Indeed, the Supreme Court's only explicit discussion of the issue
has come in a one-paragraph pronouncement in a case otherwise concerned with
the ex post facto clause of the Constitution. 339 In considering whether Teague
precluded the court from reaching the merits, Chief Justice Rehnquist con-
cluded: "Although the Teague rule is grounded in important considerations of
federal-state relations, we think it is not 'jurisdictional' in the sense that this
Court, despite a limited grant of certiorari, must raise and decide the issue sua
sponte. '' 34° The Court then accepted the state's explicit waiver of the Teague
retroactivity issue, and proceeded directly to its discussion of the ex post facto
claim.341 If anything, the Court's off-handed approach to the issue coupled with
its own history of sua sponte consideration of Teague 342 has left the lower courts
in greater confusion than before and has left litigants with little ability to predict
the outcome of their own cases.
Perhaps the most novel and interesting effort to limit the reach of Teague
appears in a recent Second Circuit opinion, Sanders v. Sullivan,343 which dealt
with post-trial recantation of testimony. In effect, the court held Teague inappli-
cable if the violation raised in the habeas petition was of a type that could not
have been addressed by the state trial court.344 Sanders had petitioned the court
for habeas corpus based on credible evidence that the chief witness at his trial
had recanted his testimony two years after testifying. 345 The witness's changed
story strongly supported Sanders's contention that he was innocent of one of the
337. Hanrahan v. Greer, 896 F.2d 241, 245 (7th Cir. 1990). As Judge Easterbrook stated:
Although it filed this response before the Court decided Teague, that is neither explanation
nor excuse [for failing to raise retroactivity]. Disputes about the retroactive application of
constitutional decisions have pervaded criminal procedure over the last 25 years .... Not
phrasing an objection to retroactivity in the precise terms the Court adopted in Teague is
one thing; not phrasing any objection to retroactivity is another.
Id.
338. Collins v. Youngblood, 110 S. Ct. 2715 (1990).
339. Id. at 2718.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. See supra note 332 and accompanying text.
343. 900 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1990).
344. Id. at 606; cf. 1 J. LIEBMAN, supra note 5, § 22A.1, at 96 (Supp. 1989). Liebman contends
that:
wT1here are certain kinds of claims-for example the absence of or ineffective assistance of
counsel on appeal and the denial of constitutionally mandated appellate procedures-that
do not even in theory arise until after the direct appeal is decided, and there are other kinds
of claims-for example, most ineffective assistance of counsel allegations-that as a practi-
cal matter cannot be raised until after direct appeal.... Under the plurality view, these
issues apparently could never become the basis for constitutional decision because "thresh.
old" determinations of nonretroactivity at the only stage of the proceedings in which such
claims theoretically or at least practically can arise would forbid the claim's resolution on
the merits.
Id.
345. Sanders, 900 F.2d at 602-03.
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crimes of which he had been convicted. The district court denied Sanders's peti-
tion, holding that the use of perjured testimony violates due prccess only if the
prosecution knew or should have known that the testimony was perjured.
346
The court of appeals rejected that view, finding instead that due process is vio-
lated "when a credible recantation of the testimony in question would most
likely change the outcome of the trial."
'347
On remand, the district court decided that the recantation was credible and
that knowledge of the perjury would have altered the jury verdict.3 48 Conse-
quently, the district court granted Sanders's petition. On appeal from this deci-
sion, the state argued that the court of appeals had altered the constitutional
standards that prevailed at the time that the original proceedings took place and,
therefore, that Sanders should not be able to claim the benefit of the "new rule"
under Teague.
3 49
Without deciding whether its first Sanders opinion350 had announced a new
rule, a panel of the Second Circuit held the Teague analysis inapplicable to the
matter presently before it.351 As Judge Lumbard explained, "[t]he 'new rule'
inquiry effectively asks habeas courts to place themselves in the position of a
state appellate court on direct review and, by so doing, discern whether the con-
stitutional standards then prevailing would have provided the defendant any re-
ief."1352 Because the error complained of could not have been known to-or
rectified by-the trial court, Teague's rationale of protecting the reasonable
good faith decisions of the trial court did not apply.
353
Indeed, in one sense, the error itself did not arise until after the defendant's
conviction was final. As Judge Lumbard wrote:
Because recantations typically do not occur until after the trial
and direct review are completed, the state's failure to reverse the con-
viction does not speak to the conduct of the state's criminal proceed-
ings. A habeas petitioner alleging that a crucial trial witness perjured
himself does not contend that the state conducted the trial illegally or
otherwise acted in an unconstitutional fashion. Instead he contends, as
Sanders does here, that it is unlawful for the state to continue his cus-
tody in light of the recantation-a violation for which a writ of habeas
corpus is the petitioner's central remedy.
354
The court recognized that because the recanting witness did not come forward
346. Sanders v. Sullivan, 863 F.2d 218, 222 (2d Cir. 1988).
347. Id.
348. Sanders, 900 F.2d at 603.
349. Id. at 605.
350. Sanders, 863 F.2d at 222.
351. Sanders, 900 F.2d at 606.
352. Id. In dicta, the court also announced that even if Teague applied to the case and the rule
regarding recanted testimony were found to be new, it would fall within Teague's second exception
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until two years after Sanders's conviction became final, Sanders had no other
avenue for relief except collateral review.35 5 If that relief were precluded by
Teague, the "right to federal habeas relief against unlawful state custody would
be emasculated.
'356
As the tone of the Sanders opinion amply demonstrates, the Second Circuit
was distressed by the prospect of an innocent person remaining incarcerated as a
result of a rule which, simply because the prosecution was not involved in the
perjury, did not require the state to consider recanted testimony. Moreover, the
court appeared to find equally distasteful the idea that the so-called novelty of a
rule requiring consideration of recanted testimony might permit the state to
maintain custody of an innocent person. The facts of the Sanders case are thus
both unusual and unusually sympathetic. Nevertheless, the court's limitation of
Teague to rules and errors that might have been cognizable by the trial court is
an interesting approach, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Sawyer v. Smith, which was largely cast in terms of the good faith adjudication
of the state courts.357 At the very least, the Sanders rationale would permit
habeas courts to consider novel claims that could not have been raised on direct
review, including claims focusing on appellate delay and ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel.35 8 Indeed one of Teague's serious failings is that it effectively
forecloses any federal forum-and possibly any forum at all-for these types of
claims. Thus, the Sanders decision may prove to be an instructive avenue of
reasoning. It is simply too early to tell.
V. CONCLUSION
In many respects, the jury is still out on the effects of Teague v. Lane and its
new doctrine of nonretroactivity. The initial response has been notably hos-
tile.359 There is much concern that Teague will eviscerate federal habeas corpus
and rob the lower federal courts of their proper function of providing as-of-right
review for all federal constitutional issues in criminal cases, substituting discre-





357. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
358. See supra note 338 and accompanying text.
359. Liebman notes various examples, including the following: S. 1757, 101st Cong. 1st Sess.,
§ 2262, 135 CONG. Rxc. S 13475 (Oct. 16, 1989) (proposal of Senator Biden to repeal Teague legisla-
tively in capital cases and to reinstate the pre-existing three factor test); ABA Task Force on Death
Penalty Habeas Corpus, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty
Cases (Oct. 1989) (proposing that any claim that casts doubt on the accuracy of the sentencing
determination or the guilt of the capital defendant be governed by the law existing at the time the
habeas court considers the petition); Resolution of the Litigation Section ofthe ABA Regarding Re-
form of Habeas Corpus on Capital Cases (Adopted September 9, 1989), at 4 (endorsing the Biden
approach for guilt phase claims in capital cases but making all new constitutional rules affecting the
sentencing phase fully retroactive); Statement of the Civil Rights Committee of the Association ofthe
Bar of the City of New York Concerning Legislative Modification of Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital
Cases, 44 REc. A.B. CrrY oF N.Y. 848 (1989) (proposal to make all legal changes fully retroactive in
capital cases). 1 J. LIEBMAN, supra note 5, § 22A.1, at 124-25 (Supp. 1989).
360. 1 J. LIEBMAN, supra note 5, § 22A.1, at 124-25 (Supp. 1989).
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At one and the same time, things appear to be both better and worse than
this litany of evils would indicate. They are better because it appears that fewer
cases involve Teague claims than might have been anticipated; that fewer of
these involve genuinely novel issues; and that most involve the application of
after-decided rules to habeas petitioners. They are worse because courts have
tended to apply Teague broadly, to find most rules novel and to fit few within
the Teague exceptions. They are worse still because Teague interacts with other
rules of habeas practice and procedure to create a cruel dilemma for what is the
most vulnerable class of prisoners-primarily capital defendants raising claims
for the first time either on habeas or in a second petition-in which their proce-
dural lapse is forgiven only by a showing that bars the court from hearing their
claim under Teague. Thus, although the systemic effect of Teague may be less
drastic than predicted, that effect will be felt very strongly by certain individuals.
While the interests of finality are all well and good, it is a troubling rule indeed
which permits one person to be executed and another to stay alive simply be-
cause of the date on which a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court is denied.

